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Abstract
The investigation described hereunder looked at the effects of the spatial layout and
functionality of cockpit displays and controls on crew communication. Specifically, the
study focused on the intra-cockpit crew interaction - and subsequent task performance - of
airline pilots flying different configurations of a new electronic checklist, designed and
tested in a high-fidelity simulator at NASA Ames Research Center. The first part of this
proposal establishes the theoretical background for the assumptions underlying the
research, suggesting that in the context of the interaction between a multi-operator crew and
a machine, the design and configuration of the interface will affect interactions between
individual operators and the machine, and subsequently, the interaction between operators.
In view of the latest trends in cockpit interface design and flight-deck technology - in
particular, the centralization of displays and controls - the introduction identifies certain
problems associated with these modem designs, and suggests specific design issues to
which the expected results could be applied. A detailed research program and
methodology is outlined, and the results are described and discussed. Overall, differences
in cockpit design were shown to impact the activity within the cockpit, including
interactions between pilots and aircraft and the cooperative interactions between pilots.

1. Introduction
1.1. General
Advances in technology have greatly impacted the appearance of the modern aircraft
cockpit. Where once one would expect to see rows upon rows of dials and switches, the
modern cockpit resembles a rack of CRT screens and data-entry keyboards. Technological
advances have also changed the aviation system as a whole: more sophisticated and
accurate air-traffic control facilities guide highly automated aircraft through highly
congested airways, often in marginal weather conditions, on their way to airports that are
operating at close to maximum capacity. With the accelerating speed of technological
development, particularly with the miniaturization of high-speed computers that so greatly
impacts the weight-conscious aviation industry, the trend toward added cockpit automation
is expected to continue.
The rapid pace of introduction of computer-based devices into the cockpit has outstripped
the ability of designers, pilots, and operators to formulate an overall strategy for their use
and implementation (Wiener, 1988). Within this technological frenzy, at the center of the
expanding network of sophisticated technologies, the human operators - the pilots - find
themselves continuously trying to keep up with the fast rate of change. Not surprisingly, a
large percentage of aircraft accidents are attributed to human error: for air carriers, about
two thirds of all accidents are attributable to the cockpit crew; for general aviation, the rates
are even more disproportionate, with almost 9 out of 10 accidents attributable to human
causes (Nagel, 1988). While these figures may accurately reflect the apparent cause of an
accident, it is important to remember that, rather than being the main instigators of
accidents, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects created by poor design,
incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions (Reason, 1990).
This research was directed at the first of these inheritances with which the pilots have to
deal, namely, the design of cockpit interface.
How does the design of a cockpit affect the performance of each pilot operating within it?
How do differences in individual performance affect the synergetic performance of the
pilots as a crew? How does cockpit design impact on crew communication? This study
looked at the constraints imposed on crew communication by the design of the system
which they operate, focusing on the airline cockpit as one context in which design and
communication are viewed as linked. Building on the analysis of 'real world' accounts, and
on theoretical constructs concerning human communication and human-machine
interaction, a research program is described. The primary objective of the research was to
identify the relationship between cockpit configuration and crew communication style - in
particular, the non-verbal aspect of crew communication - with the applied purpose of
defining useful guidelines for future cockpit-design processes.
As will be described in greater detail below, this project was based on the assumption that
in the interaction between a team of operators and a machine, much of the information
exchanged between operators is non-verbal. Further, it was assumed that the particular
design of the interface between team and machine may affect the non-verbal aspect of
information exchange, and thus directly impact the way in which the team-members
communicate and coordinate their activities. Finally, this research program was oriented
toward application; the only kind of research that qualifies as human factors research is
research that is undertaken with the aim of contributing to the solution of some design
problem (Chapanis, 1991). Accordingly, the Discussion (section 5.) looks at the potential
applications of conclusions drawn from the results obtained in this study.
In order to establish the need for this research program, the author searched through
existing records for indications that crew communication does indeed rely on the flow of
activity-related, non-verbal, information for the engagement and coordination of individual
operators. In particular, the search focused on incidents in which operators themselves
described the situation as one in which they had used information other than verbal in
performing their task within the crew context. This report begins with a discussion of
several examples in aviation which provide the backdrop for the following theoretical
discussion and subsequent description of the research program.
1.1.1. Background research: ASKS reports
In the preparatory phase of this study, accounts were compiled from NASA's Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASKS, 1991), a database that holds reports submitted voluntarily
by aircrew following incidents which they consider irregular. The reports are subjective
accounts of what transpired in the cockpit during the incident, as narrated by operators who
were actively involved in the flight process. At the time of this search, the ASKS database
contained 35,151 full-form records received since January 1, 1986. There were also 67,987
abbreviated-form records in the database, but since these do not contain textual information,
they were excluded from the search. In all, 424 relevant reports were identified. The real
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power of ASRS lies in the report narratives, as the reporting system is limited from a
statistical perspective: since all ASKS reports are voluntarily submitted, they can not be
considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. Moreover,
since not all pilots are equally aware of the ASKS, the data reflect reporting biases. As
suggested by the ASKS office, only one thing can be known for sure from ASKS statistics -
they represent the lower measure of the true number of such events which are occurring.
While reading through the brief reports, it is helpful to reconstruct the situation, and
imagine the sequence of events unfolding. Readers should notice the particular impact of
non-verbal information on crew communication and coordination. To aid with this
perspective, each example is followed by the author's remarks, which were prepared based
on the author's extensive aviation experience, as well as discussions of these examples with
other experienced pilots. The examples have been numbered, as they will be used to
illustrate points made in the discussion further below. The accounts have been slightly
edited to allow for better reading.
Example 1: "The warning horn indicating cabin altitude exceeding 10,000' came on
while cruising at 35,000'. Before I could silence the horn and analyze the problem.., the
First Officer commenced and executed an emergency descent drill: throttles to idle,
speed-brakes out, and transponder frequency to 7700 (emergency signal) - exactly by
the book. The aircraft was well out of 35,000' before I could comprehend that an
emergency descent was in progress. No discussion, just down we go! What happened
to crew coordination? I have no answer..."(ASRS # 137152)
Remarks: Note the shared context provided by the auditory information from the
warning horn, a context within which the Captain (CA) was able to make sense of
what the First Officer (FO) was doing (even though he did not necessarily agree with
the actions). Notice the level of detail at which he was able to perceive the FO's
actions; he did not need the FO to tell him what he was doing - that was obvious from
seeing the actions; nor did he need to be told why it was being done - that was obvious
from hearing the horn. The only thing missing, from the perspective of the reporting
operator, was a discussion of whether that particular procedure, rather than any other,
was appropriate.
Example 2: "As we added power for takeoff.., the Second Officer (SO) pointed out a
light aircraft immediately ahead of us at about 1000'... I almost decided to abort the
takeoff, but a second later the light aircraft began a right turn, so I continued the
takeoff. Because of the disturbance and worry about the light aircraft, I did not notice
or keep track of the rapidly accelerating airspeed, and missed the FO's callout of
takeoff speeds. Meanwhile, because of the increasing speed, the airplane began to
pitch up and the FO, sensing that we were tail-heavy, began to trim the stabilizer nose-
down... I was unaware that the FO had changed the stabilizer setting, and therefore
misunderstood when the takeoff warning horn sounded (it sounds automatically
when the trim is beyond a certain setting). I began to reduce power to abort the
takeoff, but both FO and SO correctly advised me that it was too late to abort, and that
the trim had been changed. Takeoff was continued with no further problems." (ASKS
#96238)
Remarks: Notice the different sources of information to which operators were
directing their attention: the CA was engaged with looking at the light aircraft, and
missed the FO's calls for takeoff speed; the FO was engaged with the change in pitch,
and missed the connection between that and the increasing speed; the CA was
unaware that the FO had changed the stabilizer setting, and thus misinterpreted the
warning horn. Notice that since both FO and SO knew that the setting was changed,
they understood that the horn was warning about the change in stabilizer setting (trim
out of the green band), and, realizing that the CA was unaware of their high speed and
that the trim had been changed, correctly advised him to continue the takeoff.
Example 3: "On instrument approach to landing. The aircraft was well above the
glide-slope. At approximately 700' above ground level, the First Officer advised of the
need for a missed approach procedure. Go around was called, power was applied by
Captain, gear and flaps were raised by First Officer; no verbal commands were given,
and no acknowledgments of actions were made. The aircraft immediately pitched up
to excessive nose high attitude, well in excess of 35 degrees. The airspeed bled off to
approximately 80 knots. At this point, the Captain was unable to exert enough
forward control pressure and yelled for First Officer to help. Both pilots had full
forward control pressure with the stick shaker sounding (stall warning). Neither pilots
were able to take their hands off the controls. The Captain twice yelled for flaps up;
after second call the Flight Engineer raised flaps in response to Captain's command.
The nose of the aircraft began gradually lowering to less excessive pitch. After critical
stage, the climb and approach checklist were then read again, and an uneventful
approach and landing was made..."(ASKS # 79837)
Remarks: Once the go around had been announced, i.e. clear intention verbally stated,
the actual control actions were performed silently; there was so much redundant
information that indicated that engine power has been applied - e.g., throttles forward,
instrument readings, increase in engine sound, acceleration felt by the "seat of the
pants" - there was no need for the CA to say "power applied." There was, however, not
enough information about the true flap position - although FO reached for, and
manipulated, the flap control, he apparently moved it to the wrong position.
Throughout the entire event, the aircraft's extreme and unusual attitude provided all
three crew members with a context within which actions were perceived and
interpreted. Note the reference to the stick shaker, which provided both tactile and
auditory information that warned of an imminent stall. Now, in contrast to this very
dynamic situation, notice how informative the lack of action may be:
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Example 4: "...While all of this was happening, I noticed the Captain was
unresponsive. I know that he was diet controlled diabetic and told him to eat. He did,
and became responsive in a few minutes..." (ASKS #84100)
Remarks: Within this particular control context, observing a lack of activity prompted
the FO to draw certain conclusions, and take corrective action to remedy this
potentially disastrous situation. Thus, while actions provided the context for
interpretation of events in the first three examples, inaction was the key piece of
information in this account.
The accounts illustrate the point that, in the context of a team workstation such as an aircraft
cockpit - where experts cooperate in performing a highly-demanding task - it is almost
impossible for an individual operator to do anything that does not constitute inter-crew
communication. Actions performed by one operator, or expected actions that are not
performed, carry certain expectancies and meanings for other operators (see Klein, 1989, for
a discussion of the close connection between expertise and expectancies). Thus, actions have
consequences not only for the machine, but also for other operators who are present when
the actions are performed. The study of team coordination, and the design of team-machine
interface, must therefore include in their scope more than simply the auditory, speech-
based, interaction between team members.
1.2. Team-machine interface: fundamental characteristics
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In sports, being a good team player involves more than simply being proficient at the
technical skills of the game and standing on the same court with other players. In
basketball, for example, some players are considered good individual players, while others
are considered good team players. Since basketball is fundamentally a team sport, and at
the same time, one where players often find themselves facing one-on-one situations, the
combination of these two attributes - good individual and team skills - was what made great
players such as Magic Johnson, Larry Bird, or Michael Jordan.
When teams are assembled - whether in sports, business, industry, or any other area of
cooperative (co-operative) human activity - the context created by the aggregation of
operators has unique attributes. Above all, it defines two tasks, two categories of
interactions, pertaining to two activities that the operators need perform; two different - yet
inevitably integrated - classes of interaction. One class of interaction emerges from the
interface between the team and the task environment in which they operate; in this category, we
look at the team's overall goals, and how team actions affect the machine and the
environment. The other class of interaction emerges from the interface between individual
team members; here, we focus on how the flow of information within the team affects the
coordination and cooperation between individual members. This group process is shaped by
the interplay of aspects of its composition and structure, and the demands of the task
environment (McGrath, 1964). Thus, in the particular context of team-machine interaction,
aggregating operators creates a context that includes two categories of interactions: that
which is usually called "control," and that which is called "communication." The first
category includes the exchange of information between operators and machine through
displays and controls; the second category includes the exchange of information between
operators, utilizing all modalities of perception and action.
The arguments developed in the following discussion outline the critical role played by
designers of team-machine systems in determining the particular relationship between the
two tasks of control and communication. Since the group process includes the interactions
among members as the group performs its task within its environmental setting (McGrath,
1964), it seems reasonable to assume that significant changes to that environmental setting
could result in significant changes in the group process; technological characteristics have
influences on individuals, as well as on organizational structures (Hulin & Roznowski,
1985). While acknowledging that team cooperation and performance is affected by operator
training, experience and skill level, investigation of personal aptitude, learning and
expertise goes beyond the scope of this research program.
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1.2.1. Crew communication
Crew cooperation (co-operation) within a specific task environment depends directly on the
quality of communication between the individual crew members. The dictionary defines
"communication" as: "The act of imparting, conferring or delivering, from one to another"
(Webster's, 1983). What crew members continuously exchange in the cockpit is information,
and it is on the crucial flow of information that this discussion focuses.
The questions have been asked before: What is the nature of the mechanism that allows a
group to work together in a task performance situation? How is responsibility delegated,
how often do group members communicate with each other, what is the style of their
interchange? (Foushee & Helmreich, 1988). Numerous experimental and conceptual papers
have made significant contributions towards answering these questions (for several
important studies of crew interaction in the aviation domain, see: Foushee & Manos, 1981;
Foushee, 1982, 1984; Kanki et al., 1989a; Kanki et al., 1989b; Linde & Shively, 1988; Costley et
al., 1989; Shaffer et al., 1988; Foushee & Helmreich, 1988; Strauss and Cooper, 1989). Current
understanding of crew coordination stands on the broad base of empirical and theoretical
data accrued by these and other studies. These studies have revealed some important,
systematic effects relating the frequency and type of communication to the efficiency - or
error-proneness - of cockpit crew performance.
Foushee & Manos' (1981) analysis of cockpit voice recordings uncovered several interesting
relationships between crew communication and performance. While there was a tendency
for crews who communicated less not to perform as well, the type or quality of
communication played an even more pivotal role in performance: there was a negative
correlation between crew member observations about flight status and certain type of
system-control errors. At the same time, there was a negative correlation between system-
control errors and acknowledgments of information provided by other crew members;
increased acknowledgments were also related to fewer errors overall. Frequency of
commands was associated with a lower incidence of flying errors. Finally, crews who
tended to make more errors exhibited higher rates of response uncertainty, frustration or
anger, embarrassment, and lower rates of agreement.
The two studies by Kanki et al. (1989a; 1989b) used a high-fidelity full-mission simulation,
flown by active line pilots, to study the relationship between communication variations and
aircrew performance. The realistic flight scenario included weather conditions and an
equipment failure which necessitated a substantial amount of crew coordination.
Performance was evaluated on-line by expert observers present in the simulator cab during
the sessions, as well as by later analysis of videotapes. Subsequently, crews were
categorized in terms of high, mid, or low-error descriptions. Transcriptions of all verbal
exchanges were coded into a system which focused on 2-step speech sequences: initiating
speech (commands, questions, observations and dysfluencies), and response speech (reply,
acknowledgments and zero response). Although the identification of specific patterns was
not clear, overall, the pattern which distinguished the 4 low-error (high performance) crews
from the rest was the adoption of a standard form of communicating. The researchers
concluded that coordination and performance were enhanced by the regularities in
communications which afforded predictability of crewmember behavior and confirmation
of expectations.
Linde & Shively (1988) conducted a field study of the operations of police helicopters,
focusing on the relationship between workload and crew communication. The data were
collected during two weeks of audio and video recordings of in-flight police operations;
subjective ratings of workload were taken in flight, and during debriefing. In addition, the
heart rates of both crew members were recorded. They found that the frequency of intra-
cockpit communication depended on the segment of the flight (mission vs. transit), and on
communication type (mission relevant vs. non-mission relevant). Thus, when the workload
was high, virtually no time was spent on non-mission relevant communication; conversely,
when the workload was low, the crew "filled" the auditory space by discussing non-mission
relevant issues. Further analysis of the transcripts was performed, in an attempt to identify
the usefulness of linguistic fluency as a measure of crew fatigue. Their results suggest that a
fatigued crew was 2.5 times more likely to commit a linguistic dysfluency - such as a stutter
or hesitation - than a rested crew. They concluded that the voice channel is not "free" of
variations in workload, and that implementations of voice-activated input/output systems
should take this into consideration.
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Strauss & Cooper (1989) attempted to identify the impact of automation and crew structure
on crew communication and performance. In their simulation study, 50 two-person crews
flew a ninety minute mission, in which they encountered seven failures of ground-based
navigational aids and cockpit automated equipment. Crews were composed to be either
heterogeneous or homogeneous with respect to flight experience, age, leadership style, and
attitudes toward crew interaction. These two levels of crew composition were crossed with
two levels of aircraft automation - no automation, or two axis autopilot. Analysis of the
transcribed intra-cockpit communication suggest that under conditions of automated
control, more information exchange took place. Crews that exchanged a higher ratio of task
relevant to task irrelevant communication performed better in these circumstances.
Although the communication patterns were often related to performance in predictable
ways, the investigators were unable to conclude any causal relationship between the two,
and suggest that further analysis is necessary.
Most studies of air-crew communication have focused uniquely on the verbal interaction
between the operators, analyzing recorded speech transcripts in an effort to capture the
information flow within the crew. The above dictionary definition of "communication,"
however, does not limit itself exclusively to speech, i.e., the act of communication is not
inherently confined to verbal interaction. Further, as suggested by aviation lore (e.g.
Hawkins, 1987), and with the support of such documented accounts as the ASRS records
presented above (1.1.1.), pilots do capitalize on more than verbal/auditory information for
crew coordination. By default, this added category of information gets labeled as "non-
verbal." Interestingly, while the 1970's marked a transition in the way social sciences regard
non-verbal communication, moving toward a legitimate and identifiable area of scholarship
(Burgoon, 1980), this perspective has yet to be embraced by the engineering-oriented human
factors community. Thus, while the amount of information pertaining to non-verbal
communications has become overwhelming in the "softer" social sciences (Burgoon et al.,
1989), information pertaining to non-verbal interactions within a particular task
environment - specifically, in the context of mufti-operator interactions with a continuous
control tasks such as flying - is almost non-existent. It seems reasonable to assume it
unlikely that - given the availability of several sources of information - pilots would actually
rely on verbal information alone; whenever possible, humans, like all living organisms, rely
on redundancy for perception. The discussion in the next section makes a slight detour
from the aviation paradigm in order to further establish the role of redundancy - and
multiple sources of information - in perception and action.
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1.2.2. Perception and redundancy
Perception and redundancy are intimately linked; perceptual systems - i.e. living organisms
- learn to capitalize on the redundancy of information available in their environment.
Further, organisms learn to capitalize on redundancy itself as a source of higher-level
information ("higher" in relation to individual events), i.e. on the patterning or predictability
of particular events within a larger aggregate of events (Birdwhistell, 1970; Bateson, 1972).
For a good illustration of this point, we can look to nature, which always provides
wonderful examples of the ecology of behavior.
A small European bird, the indigo bunting, migrates at night, relying primarily on the
pattern of stars in the sky to orient itself. Although it is sensitive to the earth's magnetic
field, when the sky is visible, the indigo bunting will use the visual information even if it
conflicts with the sensory information provided by the magnetic field. In a fascinating
study, Emlen (1975) demonstrated that the bunting orients itself relative to that particular
point in the night sky around which all stars rotate; thus, the bird inevitably directs itself in
relation to the north, or polar, star. By placing the birds in a planetarium and rotating the
night sky around stars other than the north star, Emlen produced a tendency in the birds to
orient in the direction of the artificial polar star; even if the point of singularity, the fixed
point, was occluded by clouds, the birds were able to accurately orient themselves toward it
by referring to the angular motion of the stars that were visible. In this scenario,
redundancy exists within the same modality - i.e. all relevant information is detected by the
visual system. The redundancy of information available in the visually rotating field of
stars, and the organism's ability to capitalize on that redundancy, are key to understanding
the indigo bunting's behavior, i.e. the dynamic organization of its perception and action.
The ability of pigeons to navigate accurately during day or night is well documented, and
has been exploited by man for many centuries. Experimental studies suggest that pigeons
are able to use the sun's position in the sky as a directional guide (Keeton, 1974); on overcast
days, or at night, they use their sensitivity to the earth's magnetic field to do the same
(Wiltschko et al., 1981). Interestingly, experimental disruptions of the bird's detection of the
magnetic field (using a miniature electric coil fitted on its head, along with a battery
strapped to its back - quite a hideous sight) have no effect whatsoever when the sun is
visible; they do, however, cause disorientation when the sun is occluded by clouds. Thus, it
seems that the information provided by the sun's position preempts the information
provided by the magnetic field (Walcott, 1972). Further complexity was introduced by
Kiepenheuer (1985), who demonstrated that pigeons can also use olfaction as a means for
orientation. These findings demonstrate not only the pigeon's ability to sense different
forms of directional information, but also its ability to differentiate between the different
information fields, and select the particular form that is most appropriate for any given
context.
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Like the indigo bunting and the pigeon, the human perceptual system too thrives on
redundancy. For example, in the case of locomotion and navigation, information about the
direction of motion is available redundantly in the entire optic flow field, in accelerations
perceived by the vestibular system, in doppler-type effects produced by sounds bouncing
off stationary objects, in kinesthetic feedback from limbs and muscles, and in shifts
perceived by the olfactory system. While certain perceptual modalities are relied upon more
than others - e.g., visual information usually plays a larger role in human navigation than
does olfaction - there are situations in which the prioritization of information sources may
change, or at least, situations in which the relationship between the information provided by
two different modalities provides information at a higher level of analysis. For example,
certain kinds of electrical fires may start with a strong smell of burning plastic, without any
visual cues such as smoke or flames; the nose detects information that, along with the lack of
visual information, suggests a particular type of event. Another good illustration of the well
established role of redundant processing in the perception of depth, described by Wickens et
al. (1989); in this review, motion, stereopsis and occlusion were determined to be
particularly salient cues for depth perception. As in the case of motion, depth perception
relies on the interaction between multiple cues - albeit in the same modality - the weight of
which is determined by the particular context and task.
In communicating, humans rely on a broad spectrum of information provided by both
words and actions, as well as by the environment within which the interaction takes place.
Humans - just like the other living organisms described above - learn to capitalize on all
forms of information that the situation presents (Rochlin, 1987; Lave, 1988; Hutchins, 1989;
Klein, 1989). True, in certain cases, language and related symbol systems (e.g., American
Sign Language, Morse Code) may be used to convey information that can only be presented
symbolically, such as the description of a plan, the diagnosis of a situation, or discussing
yesterday'sdinner. At most times, however, particularly when people are actively involved
in a physical task and interact within the same physical environment, what people say is not
independent of what they do. If we study communication by looking at verbal interactions
alone, we set ourselves up, a priori, to learn about only a subset of the communication
domain. In order to capture the complexities of behavior, we have to work with a model
that allows us to see the complexities (Olsen & Rasmussen, 1989). Thus, it must be assumed
that there is more to crew communication than meets the ear; in order to capture the
complexity of this behavioral domain, crew communication should be investigated from the
broadest perspective possible.
1.2.3. Remote vs. same workspace
Because of the critical relevance of workspace design to task structure, a distinction must be
made between situations in which operators share the task of control but do so from
different stations, and those situations in which operators control the system while sharing
one, multi-operator control station. In the first situation, operators in individual, segregated
- and often remote - stations, coordinate their activities through the system (the "machine"),
using auditory and visual channels provided by the system to transmit and receive
information; radios, telephones, screens displaying verbal and video information, as well as
feedback pertaining to changes in the system, provide individual operators with the
information essential for crew coordination. Individual operators interact directly - i.e.,
physically and visually - with the technological system only, and indirectly - i.e., via
channels provided by the mediating technology - with the task environment, which includes
other operators.
McGrath & Hollingshead (1993), in a discussion of Group Support Systems (GSS), make a
similar distinction between "distal" and "contiguous" groups. As they accurately point out,
while contiguous - i.e., face-to-face - communication may rely on all modalities, distal
communication entails reliance on only a reduced set of modalities. Unfortunately, they
include discussion of face-to-face communication only as a baseline for comparison, and do
not expand on the potential impact of GSS that are used in contiguous, same work, space,
situations. Although they acknowledge that technological enhancements do not necessarily
require group members to be spatially separated from each other, their analysis focuses on
the impact of technology on distal groups. The literature contains quite a number of related
articles (e.g., Helander, 1985; McGuire et al., 1987; Olson & Olson, 1992; McLeon, 1992;
Heath & Luff, 1992), most of which look at the extreme scenario of communication between
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peopleoperating from different locations. The contribution of these studies to the current
discussion is in their description of group cooperation that is often completely devoid of
direct interaction. From this perspective, one may imagine a group communication
continuum, anchored at one end with direct face-to-face communication, and, at the other
end, with pure technology-mediated communication, such as electronic mail. Thus,
differences in cockpit automation may be creating operational environments that lie at
different points along this continuum.
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While cockpit automation does indeed introduce novel information into the group process,
the fundamental quality of crew communication in the cockpit remains one of "content rich,"
(McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993), face-to-face communication. Thus, the information added
to the cockpit environment by technology and automation is precisely that - added
information, as opposed to GSS in the classical sense of the word, where technology aims to
replace and compensate for lost information. A recently published article may serve to
illustrate the essential components of GSS studies. Kiesler & Sproull (1992) looked at how
people behave in decision-making meetings conducted through one particular electronic
communications technology - electronic mail. They compared face-to-face meetings with
the computer-mediated condition, in which each group member participated from a
different office in the same building. Groups were presented with a decision task; raw data
included individual and group choices, questionnaire response, and tape recordings and
electronic transcripts of group discussions.
The results were powerful: it takes much longer for an electronically-mediated group to
make a decision - as much as 10 times as long - as it does for the face-to-face group; in
electronic discussions, participation is distributed more equally, regardless of status or
gender; when groups make decisions using electronic communication, they have more
difficulty reaching consensus than when they meet face-to-face. It seems reasonable to
assume that these three findings are related: e.g. in the electronic communication group,
greater participation leads to difficulty in reaching consensus, taking a longer time for
decision-making. Interestingly, problems which were designed to measure the riskiness and
quality of decisions yielded differences between the two conditions: groups that met face-
to-face were risk averse for gain choices and risk seeking for loss choices, while groups that
met using the computer to communicate were somewhat risk seeking in all circumstances.
The investigators speculate that the basis of the risk-taking difference was the reduced social
information - e.g. non-verbals, status, gender - which may have made group members less
sensitive to implicit social pressure and accountability.
The researchers attribute all the differences between groups to one or another aspect of the
attenuation - to at least some degree - of the social context cues available in face-to-face
conversations. However, these social context cues are available in the cockpit; research has
shown that personal attitude and group orientations had significant impact on group
process variables and crew coordination (e.g. Helmreich, 1982). Thus, cockpit technology
can be assumed to play a different role in shaping crew communication. In the context of
the research described hereunder, it would be interesting to see whether any of these
findings demonstrated by Kiesler and Sproull emerge in cockpit crew communication. Does
cockpit automation affect the time it takes the crew to make a decision? Does it enable crew
members to state their opinion more dearly, thus creating more balance and participation in
the decision process? What role does automation play in the riskiness of decision-making?
While some of these questions go beyond the particular objectives of this proposal, it is
hoped that the results will provide an initial basis for the discussion and comparison of GSS
and cockpit automation.
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In contrast with the distal GSS paradigm described above, when operators share the same
workstation they are exposed to both face-to-face and technological information; when
sharing a workstation, every team-member has access not only to environmental and system
information, but also to the information provided directly by the presence and "co-operation"
of team-members. In this situation, the physical layout of the system creates a context
where each operator's activities can be directly perceived by other operators, and thus can
directly inform and affect team coordination. This shared situational context (Nickerson,
1981) - or physical co-presence (Gibbs & Muller, 1990) - has been noted to affect verbal
communication in social settings, and to structure team coordination tactics in goal-oriented
task performance activities. One example of GSS research that gets doser to this scenario is
provided by a study of interpersonal video-mediated communication by Heath and Luff
(1992), in which mutual visual access was shown to provide individuals with the ability to
discern the ongoing organization and demands of a colleague's activities and thereby to
coordinate their interaction with the practical task at hand. The researchers argue that
mutual visual access provided individuals with the ability to point at and refer to objects
within the shared local milieu.
In a study that looked at both distal and contiguous communication scenarios, Chapanis et
al. (1972) investigated the communication between two operators who's task it was to
assemble a commercial product according to written instructions provided by the
manufacturer. The teams consisted of two operators - one who read the instructions,
another who did the actual assembly work - cooperated under different conditions of
information exchange, ranging from written notes only, through verbal exchange from two
different rooms, to co-presence in the same room (what they called: "the communication-
rich mode"). The task did not require any particular skill - the operators were high-school
students, who met only for the purpose of the experiment. As the contact between the
operators became more direct, the frequency and amount of communication between them
increased. Further, when the two operators were allowed to work in the same room, the
modality of communication changed: "In the communication-rich mode, subjects could, and
did, use non-verbal forms of communication. They gestured, nodded, grimaced, and used
other expressive movements of the body." Unfortunately, the investigators did not have the
tools to analyze this aspect of team coordination. As they describe it: "In some preliminary
trials, video-tape recordings were made to see if such non-verbal forms of communication
could be quantified. After consulting the literature and after reviewing the tapes, no
practical way of quantifying what was seen was apparent and the attempt was abandoned."
Rochlin et al. (1987), who studied patterns of team cooperation on board aircraft carriers,
note that the physical co-presence of operators - coupled with the practice of verbal
announcement and verification of actions - create an organization with a remarkable degree
of personal and organizational flexibility. They note that almost everyone involved in
bringing the aircraft on board is part of a constant loop of conversation and verification;
seasoned personnel do not listen so much as monitor for deviations; in the Combat Decision
Center, a number of people are "just watching," keeping track of each other's jobs, or
monitoring the situation from other locations. Operation manuals rarely discuss integration
of tasks into the whole; team coordination tactics are structured by the situation, and by the
individual, micro-level rules and details of specific tasks.
In a study of teamwork in performing the task of maritime navigation, Hutchins (1989)
looked at the effects of technology on operator communication and crew coordination. He
found that when the navigation task was performed by the team, the coordination among
the actions of the members of the team was not achieved by following a master procedure;
instead, it emerged from the interaction among members of the team, and their interaction
with the available technology. Coordination among the activities of the team members
arose because some of the conditions for each team member's actions were produced by the
activities of the other members of the team; this coordination tactic he calls "coordination by
mutual constraint." Thus, the actions performed by each operator, and the verbal exchange
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between operators - much of which was often "overheard" or monitored by others - these
provided the structure around which crew coordination was established.
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In summary, in the context of crew-type tasks, crew members base their understanding of
the "state of the world" on all the information that is available to them, i.e. the aggregate of
both verbal (speech) and non-verbal (actions) behavior, as well as the information provided
by the technological environment. Verbal communication uses only one of the many kinds
of signals that people can exchange; for a balanced view of the communication process we
should always keep in mind the great variety of other signals that can reinforce or contradict
the verbal message (Miller, 1973). In the communication process, much information is
conveyed by context and nonlinguistic means (Nickerson, 1981). Verbal and non-verbal
communication systems are redundant and complementary (Haslett, 1987). Communication
within a shared physical space - e.g. crew communication within a cockpit - is, by necessity,
a synergy of both verbal and non-verbal information.
2. Proposed perspective
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2.1. Consequential communication
The particular class of communication which emerges from cooperative human activity in
situations of co-presence is defined in this dissertation as "consequential communication."
In this definition, consequential communication is a by-product of one operator's goal-
driven activity; it is detected by the observer, rather than intentionally broadcast by the
sender. While the classic definition of "communication" suggests some intentionality on
part of the sender - "...imparting, conferring or delivering, from one to another" (Webster,
1983) - consequential communication emerges from the purposeful interaction between
human and environment, rather than purposeful interaction between humans. Here, the
actor is more of an emitter than a sender, and the observer, more of a perceiver than a
receiver (John Grinder, personal communication). The perceiver is responsible for the
categorization of the relevant information as "communication" - i.e., whether the event is to
be categorized as an act of communication depends upon the perceptual skills and directed
attention of the perceiver. Since when a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in
perceptual range of the event will have some sort of "participation status" relative to it
(Goffman, 1981) - i.e., the perceiver of aword becomes, almost by definition, the listener -
we may similarly assume that when an action is performed, those who observe it will have
some participation status relative to it.
Consider the information available to a passenger in the front right-hand seat of a
car, watching the driver navigate through morning traffic. Imagine that you are
sitting there, glancing at the driver to your left - what information can you detect?
One source of information is the environment, i.e. the surrounding vehicles and
objects as seen through the windshield and the different parameters in the car's
displays. The other source of information is the driver's actions - his physical
interaction with the car's displays and controls, his reactions to the information he
perceives in the environment: If he slams on the brakes, he most probably noticed an
obstacle or impending danger; if he operates his turn signal, he will soon be
changing lanes; very frequent glances up at the rearview mirror suggest a tailgating
car (perhaps a police car?); when he looks down to tune the radio he is attending to
its auditory feedback, and stands in danger of missing important information on the
road; frequent glances at street signs suggest he might be lost, or looking for a
specific address; and so on.
The above example illustrates several ways in which non-verbal, consequential
communication can be used as an effective mode of cooperative coordination. This may
serve as a method of monitoring individual performance and providing feedback essential
for team structure (Larson & LaFasto, 1989). Table 1 describes how consequential
communication fits into the global domain of "communication."
18
One principle holds for all cooperative task performance: once the workspace has been laid
out and the spatial context for physical actions defined, an__n_xperceivable, observed behavior
may serve for communication (Segal, 1989). As long as the observing operator is sufficiently
familiar with the task and its workspace, he can - and will - assign meaning to all actions
taken within that workspace. Actors in specific situations expect technically competent role
performance from each other (Barber, 1983); that expectation may be met, or not, on the
basis of what they see each other do. Even the lack of behavior - i.e., no observable action -
carries meaning, which, in ASRS Example 4 (1.1.1.), communicates: "I have not eaten
enough." In this sense, operators sharing a workspace cannot "not communicate" - the
common physical context for actions inherently ascribes meaning to any and all observable
behavior. Non-verbal information plays a critical role in creating the context for the crew's
verbal communications - sometimes replacing these communications altogether - and must
therefore be addressed in concurrence with verbal information.
verbal
non-verbal
intentional
direct
dialogue
gestures,
signs
unintended
while CA
talks on the
radio, FO
listens
task
peffromance
provides
.consequntial
.communication
Table 1: categories of verbal and non-verbal communication
2.2. Actionsas context for speech interpretation
Without context, words and actions have no meaning at all (Bateson, 1979); the information
conveyed is not an intrinsic property of the individual message (Ashby, 1956), but rather,
emerges from the interaction between event and context. Utterance and situation are bound
up inextricably with each other, and the context of situation is indispensable for the
understanding of the words (Malinowski, 1923). Sometimes what a person is saying
unconsciously by his actions may directly contradict what he is saying consciously with his
words (Miller, 1973). Actions provide a context that plays a critical role in the interpretation
of verbal communication, as suggested be various researchers (Nickerson, 1981; Kreckel,
1981; Haslett, 1987; Gibbs & Muller, 1990). Speech communication takes place within the
physical environment of the workspace, and is not independent of the physical behavior
that continuously takes place within the same environment (Segal, 1989). Thus, a copilot
who reacts appropriately to a command to do 'X' need not actually say "Roger, I am doing
'X'." A copilot who says: "Got you," then proceeds to do something other than what the
captain intended, is in fact communicating: "I did not understand your command." A pilot
who sits immobile at the controls, visually fixated with a glazed look on one instrument
only and mumbling: "Don't worry, everything is under control," may in fact be
communicating that things have gotten out of control.
The importance of contextual information provided by non-verbal, physical behavior is
most evident in recent studies pertaining to the implementation of "intelligent" machines in
team positions that were heretofore occupied by humans. In particular, the aviation-
oriented study by Small et al. (1988) highlights the crucial role for a context shared by the
operators as a basis for understanding verbal communication. In an attempt to define the
prerequisites which would enable the use of a "pilot's associate" - i.e. an automated, AI-
driven replacement for the copilot, designed on the basis of auditory interface - the
investigation focused on the essential characteristics of verbal interactions in the cockpit.
While the interface design assumed pilot inputs based on the technological capability of fast
and accurate speech recognition, the limitations inherent in such human-machine
interactions were very apparent. As described by the investigators in their concluding
remarks: "The single most important message from the Cockpit Natural Language study is
that the knowledge context (goals, intentions and situational awareness) of the pilot is
crucial to understanding the semantics of the (verbal) commands."
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Therelationshipbetween context and the interpretation of speech is a pivotal point in the
study of team communication and coordination. The physical form of the workstation, the
task structure, and the environment within which the team-machine system interacts - these
define a hierarchical set of nested contexts, and thus constrain the range of information that
may be perceived and understood by the operators. It is incumbent upon the designers of
complex systems to remain aware of the role they play in defining the context within which
the different issues described above - activities of "control" and "communication," individual
operator's perception of redundant information, and the emergence of consequential
communication - take place.
2.3. Team Engagement State Space (TESS): a descriptive tool
When studying a situation such as described above, i.e., where humans act and perceive in
physical co-presence, it is often useful to envision a two-dimensional space, one which
contains all the states which describe the mutually constraining relationship between the
two. The Team Engagement State Space, or TESS (Figure 2), defines a two dimensional
space which can be used to describe the team's engagement in the two different tasks, their
direction of attention to the two different sources of information offered by the team context.
It presents "communication" as one dimension of information, one class of interactions; it is
this class of information that, as discussed above, defines the difference between single-
operator and multi-operator contexts. The other dimension, "control," refers to the class of
information that is specifically related to the interface between operators and system, i.e.,
the vertical axis describes the operators' engagement in the task of interacting with, and
controlling, the system. Note that on both axes, the scale of 0-1 does not represent any
specific, quantifiable measurement of information or behavior; its purpose is to illustrate, in
an abstract way, the relative extent to which operators are engaged in the particular
dimension described.
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Imagine an aircraft parked at an airport, one hour before takeoff; while the cabin crew go
about their duties, the pilots spend several minutes discussing the flight plan. In this
situation, their involvement with the system is minimal, though their engagement with each
other is high (point 'a'). Now think of that same crew performing the first portion of their
pre-flight checklist: each operator is in charge of checking a different group of subsystems
and paperwork; each is strongly engaged with the system, with very little exchange of
information - i.e. neither intentional nor consequential communication - going on between
them (point "o'). Finally, picture the situation during the takeoff roll itself: the captain is
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Figure 2: Team Engagement State Space (TESS)
controlling the aircraft, while the first officer announces the speeds and sets the throttles to
takeoff thrust; as soon as the aircraft is airborne, the captain calls out: "Positive climb, gear
up," upon which the first officer reaches for the control that raises the gear; the captain
glances to confirm these actions. In this situation, both operators are engaged in control, as
well as in both intentional and consequential communication (point 'c').
From an investigative point of view, if a particular team is observed as operating within a
certain region of TESS, three primary, applied questions can be asked: What characteristics,
or qualities, of the team makes it operate in this region? What elements of the task constrain
the team to operate in this region? What properties of the system and the environment
constrain the team to operate in this region? To this end, it would be interesting to note if
different crews operating a similar system fall in the same area of the chart, or how changes
in flight conditions might change a particular crew's location. Similar questions could be
asked about individual operators, focusing on the relationship between different crew
members. From this perspective, one may look at the relative location of crew members in
the TESS plot. Would control and communication change at the same rate for both
operators? Could one operator's position change while the other's does not?
The primary objective in using TESS is to assists in clarifying some of the unique properties
of the team-machine paradigm, namely, the confounded relationship between control and
communication. Further, as a secondary objective, the TESS may provide a useful tool for
visualizing and exploring the resultant data set, in a manner suggested by Sanderson (1991),
after Tukey (1977).
2.4. Design as choreography
The transfer of information from the human to the machine will in general be in the form of
manual actions on the system (Rasmussen, 1986); it is, after all, called human machine inter-
action, not human-machine inter-speech or inter-thought. While one needs to acknowledge
the rapid development of speech-recognition technology and voice-activated controls, it
seems that the bulk of control activity, particularly continuous control tasks, will remain
physical. This being the case, the constraining relationship between the design of an
environment and the behavior of living systems within that environment must be
considered. Further, the applicability of the current study is of primary concern. As
suggested by Chapanis (1991), whenever possible, human factors research should attempt to
provide design recommendations; it is incumbent upon the researcher to make the
connection between the theoretical basis, the findings, and application of results to material
design problems.
The two different interfaces depicted in Figure 3 will serve to illustrate the immediate
impact of display/control layout on operator behavior. Notice that, while both address the
same interface problem - four controls for input, four displays for feedback - the difference
in their design affords different styles of human-machine interaction. Imagine you were
watching an operator interact with these interfaces: how would you perceive the effects of
design on operator behavior?
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Figure 3: Two approaches to display/control layout
As proposed in the discussion above, the physical form of the work-station defines the
constraints that shape operators' physical behavior; the spatial layout of the control
environment constrains operators to perform a particular set of movements. Location of
displays constrains them to direct their gaze and focus on particular points in space; location
of controls constrains them to reach for those locations; the particular type of control
constrains them to perform particular actions, e.g., push, twist, flip, pull. Using the sample
layouts described in Fig. 3, one can imagine observing an operator monitor and control
variables 'a' and 'd': notice the different movements of eyes, hand, and head, dictated by the
two different layouts. If one were to supervise their performance, what layout would be
preferred? Would that preference change if one were to operate the system oneself?
While physical form defines spatial constrains, the machine's operating procedures define
and constrain the temporal organization of operators' behaviors; procedures that prescribe
sequences of inputs impose on the operator constraints that dictate a particular pattern of
actions over time. For example, a procedure might determine that control 'a' must never be
manipulated before "o'; control 'd' must always precede 'c', which is usually followed by 9'.
Such procedures, coupled with the system's response time, define a pattern of actions over
time that is particular to every design, as well as to every context of operation. From this
perspective, the designer who defines the machine's logic of operation, the sequence of "if -
then" statements that govern the system, is at the same time building a temporal sequence to
which operators wilt conform in their interaction with the system. Again, Fig. 3 may serve
to help imagine the difference between the patterns of actions emerging from interactions
with the two different designs. From the perspective of an observing crewmember, note the
differential impact of system layout on consequential communication.
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Using this simple example, it is easy to see how designers are continuously confronted with
tradeoffs throughout the design process. Since movements of the head that are needed to
read instruments in a control room may take part in the identification of the source of the
information (Rasmussen, 1986), integrated displays, while useful at alleviating the workload
imposed on single operators (Wickens, 1992), may greatly reduce the availability of
consequential communication, thus impairing the ability to monitor operator behavior.
Integrated controls may similarly reduce one operator's abilities to observe another's
activities. These considerations come into play when deciding on cockpit configurations for
future aircraft, for example, in the current debate over the configuration of the cockpit for
the High Speed Commercial Transport, where the narrow cross-section of the fuselage has
caused a resurgence of the question: "Should the crew sit side-by-side, or in tandem?"
(McDonnell Douglas Technical Report, 1992).
Currently, crew systems and their integration into the cockpit are being affected
dramatically by new technologies, particularly increased on-board computer capabilities
(Sexton, 1988). Elements such as CRT displays with multi-function capabilities and high
graphic resolution enable integration and spatial centralization of displayed information;
keyboards and control-mounted switches - e.g. Hands On Throttle And Stick (HOTAS)
technology - provide spatial focal points for control inputs. The traditional control panel has
been either partially or completely replaced by visual display units, and the traditional
buttons, levers and knobs have been replaced by keyboards; this can create new problems
(Ivergard, 1989).
Unfortunately, most contemporary design trends are driven primarily by the designer's
fascination with state-of-the-art technology. When everything becomes possible, when all
limitations are gone, design (and art) can easily become a never-ending search for novelty,
until newness-for-the-sake-of-newness becomes the only measure (Papanek, 1985). The
people responsible for the design of an environment are not always aware of its strong effect
on the interactions that take place within that environment (Burgoon et al., 1989). Perrow
(1983)draws a distinction between "design logic" and "operating logic"; according to his
perspective, these represent two different approaches to systems' design. He describes one
contradiction between design logic and operating logic that is particularly relevant to the
current discussion. In this example, he points out that while good design, by design logic,
is compact, good operating logic stresses easy access to controls and system-state
information. Thus, while good design favors single purpose information sources and
controls, e.g. multi-function displays (MFD), good operation requires many entry points into
the system for confirming information from different sources. While interface design is
constrained by other considerations - e.g., space, weight, performance - once again we see
the two conflicting performance criteria that designers attempt to balance - compact vs.
accessible, single vs. redundant. This phenomenon - the conflict between design logic and
operating logic - can be best described with the following "futuristic" example:
Imagine an aircraft that can be controlled by thought alone - a "utopian" dream
entertained by many engineers. Assuming that all potential problems of
measurement and reliability associated with such a system are solved, consider the
difficulties such a design would impose on the cooperative work of a crew. The
copilot would find it impossible to interpret any actions taken by the pilot, since no
physical actions would be present for observation in the first place. In this type of
control configuration, the only source of information pertaining to pilot or copilot
actions would be the responses of the aircraft and its systems to the preceding
control inputs. Thus, this design creates a critical phase lag in crew action
information effectively ruling out any possibility for intervention in the case that one
of the crew members makes a control or procedural error. Compare this to what
happens in current designs where, when an error occurs (in the cockpit of an
airliner), it is usually caught by one of the members of the crew and corrected
immediately (Stone & Babcock, 1988). In our futuristic example, the crew
environment constrains and inhibits the use of non-verbal cues to such an extent that
it directly affects the form and quality of crew communication and cooperation.
One possible improvement could be the use of Multi Function Displays, where seeing which
particular page an operator has selected may provide more specific contextual information
to an observer. The level of detail in this case, however, would depend on the logical
architecture of the menu-driven MFD: few pages of highly integrated displays would
provide less consequential communication than many pages of fewer dimensions, though
they may impose greater workload on the individual operator. The particular design of an
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MFD becomesmore critical as touch-sensitive screens serve not only as sources of
information, but also as locations for control inputs. Since this research deals specifically
with a touch-sensitive display and input interface device, it is hoped that the results shed
some light on the role of interface design in shaping crew coordination.
ASRS reports provide some powerful examples that illustrate the impact of particular
designs on aircrew activities:
Example 5: "I observed the FO switching frequency but I could not see the frequency
selected in the window because the FO's hand covered it due to its location next to
the autopilot turn knob... I reached down and raised the FO's hand off the turn knob
and observed (that he had entered the wrong frequency)..." (#59918).
Example 6: "At this time I looked at my new FO's radio panel and saw he was going
to transmit on the wrong channel, so I reached over and punched some buttons to
put him on the right one... (#56215).
Example 7 "(During emergency procedure for shutting down engine) captain put his
hand on #2 stop and feather and called "#2 stop and feather." I looked down to
verify his hand position and called "pull." Captain continued with the engine fail
checklist, and as he continued with the non memory items, I verified his hand on the
proper controls and made calls per the checklist. While watching captains hand, we
(passed the airport at which we were suppose to land)., then landed at wrong
airport... (# 105775).
Throughout the design process, the designer must be aware of these two principles: the
system's physical form shapes operator behavior, while its operating procedures organize that
behavior temporally (Segal, 1990). Designers must see themselves as choreographers; ideas
that emerge from the designer's drafting table will define a set of actions unfolding over
time, an operating "dance" that will be performed by operators whenever they interact with
that system. It is incumbent upon the designer that the dance performed allow for the
smooth flow of information between team members, and result in task performance that is
effective, productive, and safe.
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2.5. Summaryof introduction and literaturereview
As a result of the rapid advancementof cockpit technology,alongwith the generalincrease
in automation in theaviation domain,aircrewsareoperatingin environmentsthat arevery
different to thosewhich theyfacedmerelyfifteenyearsago. Meanwhile,the introduction of
automation and computer-basedtechnology has not relieved pilots of their ultimate
responsibilities;themajority of air-trafficaccidentsarestill attributed to breakdownsin pilot
and crewperformance. It washypothesizedthat onepossibleimpactof cockpitautomation
is in the areaof crew communication;this hypothesiswassupported with discussionof
researchand theory from severaldifferent fields. Group theory (e.g.,McGrath,1964;Hulin
& Roznowski, 1985;Gibbs& Muller, 1990;McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993)provided the
theoreticalsupport for the importanceof the role of technologyand communicationin the
performanceof the task. Experimentaland observationalstudies from different domains,
including aviation (e.g.,Foushee& Manos, 1981;Kanki et al., 1982;Rochlin et al. 1987;
Hutchins, 1989;Strauss& Cooper,1989),provided empirical support for theargument that
crew communicationand task performanceare linked. In the emerging domainof Group
Support Systems(GSS),the data suggest that technology indeed alters the dynamics
betweengroup members(Kiesler& Sproull,1992;Heath & Luff, 1992).With the resurgence
of tandem cockpits, suchas the suggestedconfiguration of the future High SpeedCivil
Transport, the knowledge accruedthrough GSSstudiesmay becomeparticularly relevant
for theunderstandingof cockpitdesignandcrewcommunication.
It was suggested that non-verbal information plays an important role in group
communication. This was supported by theoretical discussions, observational and
experimental studies (e.g., Malinowski, 1923;Birdwhistell, 1970;Chapanis et al., 1972;
Miller, 1973;Nickerson, 1981;Burgoon et al., 1989;Heath & Luff, 1992). The proposed
connectionbetweenautomation and non-verbalcommunication,and the proposal of the
concept of "consequentialcommunication," were partially supported by numerous real-
world examplestaken from NASA's Aviation SafetyReporting System(ASKS).With the
support provided by the abovementionedtheoreticaland empirical studies,in light of the
reports supplied by aircrew via the ASRS, and with the growing trend of cockpit
automation,it seemedessentialto start collectingempiricaldataconcerningtheimmediate
impactof cockpit automationon pilot taskperformance,andits subsequentimpactoncrew
communicationandcoordination.
Finally, the notion of consequential communication and the TESS (Figure 2) were presented
as conceptual tools for defining the problem, and as aids for discussing possible
applications. These served as the basis for the critical distinction between two types of
operator behavior - control and communication - and demonstrated the close relationship
between the two in the context of team-machine interaction.
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The current investigation was designed to tie these areas together, through an attempt to
answer two questions: 1. "Do pilots use non-verbal information for task coordination?" and
2. "How does cockpit interface impact the non-verbal communication between
crewmembers?" In the simulator study described in detail in the sections below, twelve
two-pilot crews flew the same flight scenario using three different types of checklist
interface. All flights were recorded on video tape, and crew performance was evaluated by
an expert observer during the flight. Subsequently, non-verbal and verbal cockpit activities
were coded and transcribed from the video tapes, and additional performance ratings were
given by other expert observers. The video transcripts and performance measures served as
the basis for data analysis. Details of the research methodology, results and discussion of
the results are presented below.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Background: the Palmer and Degani study
High fidelity flight simulation is extremely expensive, both in direct cost, as well as in the
amount of time it demands from skilled professionals. Further, while the recruitment of
expert pilots greatly increases the validity of the findings, it is very difficult to obtain access
to this unique subject pool. For these reasons, many simulator studies combine the work of
several different investigators; as long as experimental manipulations do not actually
conflict with one another, the same raw data may serve different investigators to study
different aspects of crew performance and behavior. This study used video data recorded in
the winter of 1990 as the basis for investigation of the non-verbal paradigm.
The original simulation, designed by Ev Palmer and Asaf Degani - FLT Branch, Aerospace
Human Factors Division (ASHFRD) at NASA-Ames Research Center - manipulated
particular interface issues that are highly relevant in the context of the current discussion.
Their interest, however, focused on the errors performed by the crews; the video tapes have
thus far been used only for error coding, not for the study of crew interaction or non-verbal
communication cues. Their initial findings were presented in a brief paper (Palmer and
Degani, 1991); an in-depth technical report has not yet been released (Palmer and Degani, in
preparation). Another study (Mosier, 1992) made use of the data to look at crew problem
resolution, but again, did not use the video data to investigate the particular variables
involved in crew communication.
3.1.1. Equipment
The experimental simulation study was carried out in the Advanced Concepts Flight
Simulator (ACFS), at the Man Vehicle System Research Facility (MVSRF) at NASA's Ames
Research Center. The ACFS was designed to simulate a two-person flight crew, twin
turbofan, advanced airliner with the capacity to carry approximately 200 passengers. The
simulator is run by a VAX 8030 main computer, which generates the flight dynamics and
concurrent visual display. Although the simulator is mounted on hydraulic pylons that
afford full motion, this capability was not used in this study.
The ACFS served as the test-bed for an electronic checklist interface design and evaluation.
Cockpit avionics included five color CRT displays (10.5" x 13.5"), which displayed primary
and secondaryflight instrumentation, systems' status information, and the two different
types of electronic checklist for the appropriate experimental conditions (see Figure 3,
section 3.1.3. below). Pilots could manipulate the information and systems displayed
through a touch panel overlay, which was mounted over each display. Thus, in the so
called "electronic" checklist conditions, performance of the checklist entailed repeated
reaching for, and touching of, the CRT displays.
3.1.2. Experimental objectives
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The objective of the Palmer and Degani study was to investigate the effectiveness of
electronic checklists for commercial air transport. Three different checklist systems were
designed and evaluated in the ACFS. The checklists were designed with the objective of
reducing errors, and the investigators' primary research questions focused on the effects of
checklist design on crew errors. Since these three checklists served as the independent
variable in the current research program, it is important to discuss their design and
functionality in greater detail.
3.1.3. Independent variable: checklist interface design
The 12 crews that participated in this experiment flew identical scenarios, using three types
of checklists (4 crews per experimental condition, or checklist type). Of the three different
checklists, two were designed as new, electronic checklists; the third checklist used was the
standard paper checklist, which served in the original study as the control condition. The
"Normal Procedures" portion of this checklist was printed using standard airline format on a
single 8.5" x 11" paper card, and the irregular procedures bound in a booklet modeled after
Boeing's Quick Reference Handbook format. Typically, the paper checklist is hand-held by
the crew-member responsible for reading out the relevant items. While this freed these
pilots from the need to interact with the checklist display described below, they still had to
interact with aircraft systems, such as fuel, electric and hydraulic systems. Those
interactions were performed with a graphical interface provided on the top half of a touch-
sensitive CRT display, mounted in front of each pilot; the bottom half of that CRT displayed
the electronic checklist.
The two electronic checklists were the Manual-Sensed Checklist (Manual), and the
Automatic-Sensed Checklist (Auto). The interaction with both was similar, in that the pilots
used the touch-sensitive CRT screens in the process of performing individual items in order
to complete the required checklist. The checklists could be presented on whichever CRT
display faced the pilot-not-flying (PNF), that is, the pilot who was in charge of performing
the checklist procedures. The checklist appeared in the bottom half of the screen, while
aircraft system graphics and controls appeared in the top half. The particular selection of
screen location was performed by the pilots themselves, according to their own distribution
of flight duties. Note that, for any particular leg in the flight, either pilot could be Pilot
Flying (PF) or Pilot Not Flying (PNF); the division of roles was left up to the crew itself, as is
the case in routine flight operations. Figure 4 presents a sketch of the cockpit layout, with a
sample checklist page. Note the location of the checklist at the bottom half of the CRT
display.
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Figure 4: ACFS cockpit layout, and sample checklist page
Both electronic checklists relied on color coding for displaying item status: items-not-yet-
performed were white, items-completed were green, and items-incomplete/skipped were
amber. While both electronic checklists were similar in appearance and graphic design, they
differed in the functional aspects of their interface; specifically, they differed in the level of
acknowledgments required from the pilots. The Manual required the pilots to acknowledge
- by touching the screen at the appropriate location - each item on the list of items to
perform. Once an item was acknowledged by the pilot, the checklist system would send an
interrogating signal to verify the state of that particular item, e.g., if "Flaps 25 °'' was touched
by the pilot, the checklist system would verify if the flaps were indeed set at 25 °. If the item
were indeed "sensed" as completed, the checklist display would reflect that fact by scrolling
down to the next item. If the item were sensed as incomplete or skipped, it would turn
amber. Once the last item on the checklist was touched, all uncompleted or skipped items
would be displayed, upon which the pilots had to choose whether they wanted to complete
them, or, if the situation warranted and authorization was given from airline operations,
override them.
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The Auto would require the pilot to interact only with those items which were not
completed; as soon as the checklist was called up, all the items were automatically scanned,
and those sensed as complete would be displayed in green. The items sensed as not
completed, and the items that could not be sensed by the system, were displayed in white -
e.g. "Cabin notification" is a checklist item which the system cannot check. Additionally, an
indication of whether an item could be sensed was provided by triangles on each line: a
dark triangle identified a sensed item, while a triangle outline identified an unsensed item
(Fig. 4). While pilots operating the Manual needed to touch the screen for every single item
included in the checklist, pilots in the Auto condition were required to check only those
items which were sensed by the system as incomplete, or that could not be sensed.
Specifically for the purpose of the current research, note that the Manual design required
pilots to reach for, and manipulate, the checklist CRT more often than did the Auto design.
Approximately 70% of the checklist items were sensed in the Auto, thus reducing the
number of interactions pilots in that condition had to make with the display.
During the simulated flights, the following data were recorded:
1. Three infra-red video cameras were mounted above and behind the pilots, and
recorded events in the cockpit. One wide-angle camera captured the entire cockpit,
including the pilots' backs; it is this view which provided most of the non-verbal crew
interaction information intended for use in the current proposal. The two other cameras
were each focused on each pilot's primary flight displays; these cameras provided most of
the information pertaining to the interaction between each individual pilot and the aircraft's
systems.
2. Several system variables (alpha-numeric) were recorded, and displayed on a fourth
videos screen in the experimenter operations station: time, a/c speed and heading, distance
from way points, checklist type (experimental condition), and checklist status.
3. Two audio channels were used to record intra-cockpit communication,
communication of the crew with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and ground crew, and ATC
communications with other aircraft on the particular radio frequencies selected by the crew.
4. During the experimental sessions, an observer - a highly experienced pilot who had
participated in previous simulation studies at NASA-Ames - sat in a jumpseat in the cockpit,
observed all crews, and rated the pilots' individual performance at the end of each leg. At
the end of the session, the observer rated the crews' overall performance. Performance
ratings were filled on forms listing various qualitative performance categories, e.g., crew
management style, checklist performance, workload distribution. For each category, the
observer would rate performance on a scale of 1 to 5, representing "poor" to "excellent"
performance, respectively.
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3.1.4. Subjects
Twenty four pilots, all from the same major US carrier, were recruited by posters placed in
the carrier's flight operations room. The recruitment process, which was arranged so that
twelve two-person crews could be put together, was coordinated with the airline's
management, as well as with representatives of the Air Line Pilot Association (ALPA).
Subjects were paid $12.50 per hour; the experiment lasted two days. Pilots were assigned to
their respective positions in the crews - Captain or First Officer - in accordance with the
position they were holding in the carrier at the time. Since data concerning pilot
performance is extremely sensitive, all precautions were taken to ensure full confidentiality
for all subjects. Figure 5 on the next page provides a general description of the experimental
design, and outlines the experimental scenario discussed in the next section.
3.1.5. Simulated scenario
The two-pilot crews were randomly assigned to one of the three checklist conditions
described above. Following one full day of training in the simulator, the crews flew a full
mission simulation, comprised of four flight segments (legs), during which data were
recorded. In an attempt to create a realistic simulation, the scenario included interactions
with all those elements in the environment with which the pilots interact in routine flights:
maintenance, ground crew, gate agents, cabin attendants, carrier dispatchers, ground
control, and air traffic control (ATC). Additionally, the crews had to complete, and comply
with, all the required standard paperwork, which was provided in the same format used by
their airline.
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Figure 5: Experimental design
During the experimental sessions, experimenters, simulator operators and simulator
engineers were situated in the experimenter operations station. Although the scenarios
were all determined ahead of time and pre-programmed, data entry terminals were used to
make any necessary inputs to the system. Progress of the session was monitored in real
time through video, audio, and computer displays. Using different communications
............ -frequencies, the simulator operator played the role of gate agent, mechanic, dispatcher,
ground crew and flight attendant; the operator even climbed up to the cockpit to deliver and
pick up documents, whenever such interaction became necessary.
In order to increase scenario realism, air traffic controllers were employed to provide real-
time ground-to-air _lnteraction within the experimental environment. One controller
provided clearance delivery and Automated Terminal Information (ATIS), and played the
role of ground control, tower and Terminal Radar Control (TRACON). Another played the
role of other aircraft at the airport and in the same airspace. A voice disguiser was used to
increase the appearance of interacting with different sources within the simulated
environment. The ATC operators were able to monitor the flight crew's actions and
conversation via a video monitor. Thus, all radio communications from and to the a/c, as
well as pseudo communications between other aircraft and ATC stations, were performed in
real time, and appeared extremely realistic.
In the original experiment (Palmer & Degani, in preparation), the crews were planned to fly
four legs: San Francisco to Sacramento, Sacramento to Stockton, Stockton to San Francisco,
and San Francisco to Los Angeles. The last leg - San Francisco to Los Angeles - was never
completed, as the simulated aircraft encountered severe engine problems immediately after
takeoff, and was forced to return for an emergency landing at San Francisco. Since this leg
was very demanding of the crew, and elicited highly dynamic behavior and
communications, it is this particular segment of the flight on which the current research
focuses.
During preparations for this final leg, the crew was advised that bird activity was sighted
around the end of the runway. Following the usual checklist performance for flight and a
usual takeoff, as the aircraft reached a certain target airspeed, an "Engine Fire" warning light
flashed on for 9 seconds, accompanied by an aural warning of "Engine Fire." At the same
time, the crew of an aircraft that took-off from a parallel runway reported to ATC that they
had suffered a bird strike, and would like to return to land. While the engine fire did not
persist - the warning light went out, and no other indications of fire were displayed (such as
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excessively high temperatures) - both engines suffered from performance deterioration. The
right engine, in particular, was affected: it produced very little thrust, with very low
indicator readings. Further, a low frequency vibration sound could be heard. The pilots
now had to manage the problem, using their experience and judgment, while conforming to
the prescribed checklist and procedures. Specifically, they had to deal with a temporary
display of engine fire warning, subsequent power loss, and a safe return for an emergency
landing.
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3.2. Results of preliminary analyses
In a study of the video data that focused on crew decision making, Mosier (1992) points out
that although all crews did indeed succeed in making a safe landing, the decisions were not
trivial. She argues that differences between the groups reflect - at least in part - the
differential impact of checklist type on crew performance. While just one of the four Paper
Checklist (Paper) crews shut down the left engine (an action considered as an error, since
the real problem was with the right engine), five of the eight electronic checklist crews
(Manual and Auto combined) made that same error. The crews that left both engines
running also discussed more information concerning the status of the aircraft. It is
important to stress that the highly controlled experimental scenario - which included the
event-driven, on-line inputs and communication with ATC - was designed to minimize
possible variations other than the particular checklist condition. Unfortunately, Mosier did
not subject the findings to rigorous statistical analyses, nor look at any measure other than
verbal utterances.
Performance ratings given by the expert observer who was present in the cockpit
throughout all flights further support the assumption that the different checklist conditions
constrained the crews to perform differently. The overall rating for communication and
decision making, which was composed of six different measures, gave the Auto condition
the highest performance ratings: 4.3 of 5; the Manual and Paper received 3.83 and 3.88 of 5,
respectively. The observer's evaluation of workload management, which included intra-
cockpit reports of workload, planning ahead for high workload situations, and usage of
appropriate resources, once again rated the Auto highest (3.75 of 5), then the Manual (3.6 of
5), then the Paper (3.1 of 5). Detailed performance ratings during the flight, including
performance of checklist, procedures, and aircraft handling, further highlighted the
apparent effects of checklist design: Auto rated highest (4.2 of 5), Paper next (3.7 of 5), then
Manual (3.6 of 5). The pattern of a clear advantage to the Auto over the two other
conditions is consistent throughout the entire set of in-flight expert performance ratings.
Thorough statistical analyses of these rating data is presented in the Results section bellow
(4.); the disagreement between the observer's ratings and Mosier's analysis is further
discussed in the Discussion section (5.).
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A preliminary analysis of the time required for checklist performance suggests not only
qualitative, but also quantitative differences between the group. For this purpose, the
duration for performance of each particular procedure was measured for each crew; in order
to provide a large basis for comparison, performance times for each crew were taken from
two different flight legs (Figure 6). There was essentially no difference between the groups
for the time between start of engine #1 and start of engine #2; this was expected, since the
interval was highly constrained, determined primarily by the time it took engine # 1 to reach
specific parameters. Once the crews got into the performance of other pre-takeoff checklists,
however, differences in task performance times started to emerge. The Auto crews
performed the "After Start" checklist significantly faster than the Paper crews (T14=3.542;
p<.01) and the Manual crews (T14--2.59; p=.02). There was no difference between the Paper
and Manual crews. The Auto crews also performed the Taxi checklist significantly faster
than the Manual crews (T14=2.69; p=.01), and somewhat faster than the Paper crews
(T14=1.93; p=.07). Again, there was no difference between the Paper and Manual crews in
Taxi checklist performance time. These preliminary data confirm that, all other aspects of
the task being equal, changes in checklist interface alone can impact the overall time for task
performance.
Finally, in a preliminary investigation of the data, the verbal transcripts were searched for
occurrences of words such as: "This, that, here," in which the auditory information alone
was not sufficient to transmit the intended message. Since the information inherent in non-
verbal activity was essential for comprehending these utterances, these events were called:
"Action Dependent Speech" (ADS). In defining these data, the ultimate measure was the
degree of relevancy which the particular pronoun presented in a manner following other
research, e.g., Tracy & Moran (1983) and Haslett (1987); if there was no local relevance to the
pronoun - e.g., if the utterance "I'll do that?' did not follow a sentence that unambiguously
identified what "that" specifically meant - the event was counted.
As shown in figure 7, this analysis - discussed in greater detail by the author elsewhere
(Segal, 1993) - revealed that the control task and the communication task were not
independent, and that pilots used information in the environment with which they
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interacted to support their communications. Pilots in the Auto condition used more in-
cockpit Action Dependent Speech than the Paper pilots, possibly relying on the added
visual reference provided by the electronic checklist display. As expected, PNFs used more
ADSs than PFs (Figure 7, left side). At the same time, since the visual information outside
the aircraft was virtually identical for all groups, no difference between the groups was
detected concerning out-the-window ADS references (Figure 7, right side).
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Figure 7: effect of pilot's role and checklist design on Action Dependent Speech.
In summary, a systematic pattern of difference between the groups has been suggested by
various preliminary analyses: the differences in overall task performance between the
different conditions noted by Mosier (1992), the differences in the time it took crews to
perform the checklists, the in-flight observer's ratings of individual and crew performance,
and the preliminary analysis of Action Dependent Speech described above. Further, low
variability in the pilots' level of competency may be assumed - all were trained by and fly
for the same airline, and received similar training in the simulator - and thus it may safely
be argued that the manipulation of checklist design indeed created task environments that
resulted in significantly different performance. The research presented below further
explored the dynamics that took place in the cockpit, focusing analysis on the inter-
dependence between the verbal and non-verbal information that emerged from the crew's
interaction with the different checklist designs within this highly demanding experimental
scenario.
3.3. Hypotheses
Based on the discussion above, the following hypotheses were proposed:
1.a. The design of the electronic checklists (both Auto and Manual) - which are
based on a touch-sensitive CRT interface - affords the emergence of non-verbal
information, in the form of touching the touch-sensitive checklist displays. This will
encourage crews that use it to rely on more non-verbal communication cues than
those crews using the paper checklist design (Paper).
1.b. Between the two electronic designs, the automated Auto provides fewer
opportunities for non-verbal communication than the Manual, and will thus result in
less reliance on non-verbal (consequential) communication.
2. The two different roles in the crew - pilot flying (PF) and pilot-not-flying (PNF) -
will yield different reliance on non-verbal communication, with the PF - who was
busy flying the plane, and thus did not perform the checklists - doing more
"detection" of PNF's in-cockpit activities, and the PNF - who was in charge of
completing the relevant checklists - doing more "emission" of consequential
information.
3. Differences in checklist design will result in significant differences in crew
performance, as measured by performance ratings provided by the expert observers.
3.4. Proposed data interpretation and coding
One of the primary reasons that non-verbal behavior has been left untouched is the
methodological difficulty which underlies all studies of non-verbal communication. This
difficulty was well illustrated in the study by Chapanis et al. (1972), described in section
1.2.3. above. Earlier experimental studies of multiple-operator task performance seem to
have encountered similar difficulties (Smith & Wilson, 1963; Wiener, 1963; Pollack &
Madans, 1964). In the preparation of this proposal, the author explored the different
methodologies available for transcription and analysis of non-verbal behavior. As an
example, the hand movement code proposed by Friesen et al. (1979) was considered, where
a hand act was defined as movements in the hand which could be coded as either illustrator,
manipulator, or emblem. They applied the code to videotapes of conversations and
inspected the reliability of their proposed methodology, with results that showed a high
degree of intercoder agreement. Ekman & Friesen (1976) developed a procedure for
measuring visibly different facial movements, where any facial movement (observed in
photographs, motion picture film, or videotape) could be described in terms of anatomically
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based action units. The anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell developed several methodologies
for encoding and analyzing facial gestures and body movements (1970). These studies focus
on such things as facial expressions and body posture as they manifest themselves in the
process of direct interaction not in the context of crew-machine interactions, in which control
activities and consequential communication play primary communicative roles. Thus,
following the theoretical background presented in the introductory discussion, and in
accordance with the hypotheses described above, this research was designed on the basis of
a different approach to the interpretation of the video and audio data collected in the
simulator.
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Obviously, a key issue was the initial definition of "communication" - i.e. when was a
message present, was it transmitted or emitted, was it received or perceived, was it
understood? These questions seem crucial in the process of constructing a methodology for
coding and interpreting the recorded video and audio data. One useful source for the
analysis of non-verbal communication is the field of animal behavior, where scientists have
focused much effort into the analysis of animal communication systems. As a guiding rule,
the following principal seems to be invaluable, and especially relevant to the current
paradigm: the meaning of the communication is the response it elicits. In this sense, the
information present in the activity of one organism can be considered as "communication"
only if it elicits a response from another organism (Alcock, 1989). While this definition does
not account for messages that are received without immediate, explicit confirmation, or
messages that demand that the receiver no....ttrespond explicitly, it is assumed that in the
context of the temporal constraints imposed by the crew's need to perform the flight task,
these kinds of events were minimized. Accordingly, the coding scheme was designed to
capture those instances where one pilot's reaching for a certain display elicited a look at that
display from the other pilot.
In order to facilitate the analysis of audio recordings, the entire flight segment was
transcribed verbatim; this, as well as the critical task of video coding, was accomplished
with the help of research assistants employed by NASA-Ames through the San Jose State
University Foundation. All verbal activities were transcribed; the coders parsed the speech
into naturally occurring "speech acts," as defined by Levinson (1983): "The making of a
statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence, by virtue of the conventional force
associated with it." Particular emphasis was put on identifying the intended receiver for
each speech act; following the categorization of speech acts by recipient, the current analysis
specifically examined those speech acts that were intended as in-cockpit, intra-crew,
communications. Thus, the analysis of verbal communication focused on speech
interactions between the pilots, and did not include verbal interactions between the pilots
and other elements in the task environment, e.g., ground stations, traffic control centers,
flight operations. While it is unquestionable that such speech activity provides much
consequential information, this study did not look at this particular form of crew interaction.
Next, the coders looked at the non-verbal activity in the cockpit. Four categories of activity
were defined, and the occurrence and duration of each was entered into a time line which
included the activities of both pilots in each crew. These categories of observable, non-
verbal activity were:
1. "Look": Pilot looks at his/her pilot's checklist display
2. "Touch": Pilot touches/manipulates own checklist display;
3. "Point-In": Pilot points at own checklist display
4. "Point-out": Pilot points out the window
Once the video coding process began, the data collected by the three coders for a particular
video tape was compared. It became clear that the coding task could not be performed
reliably by any one coder, and that if the task were performed by independent coders, the
correlation between their data files would not satisfy basic requirements. It was decided,
therefore, that three coders would work interactively on all the video data, consulting with
each other to clarify ambiguous segments, and coding on the basis of consensus. For the
purpose of performing time-series analysis, the data were subsequently entered into
MacShapa (Sanderson, 1993), a unique computer program designed for Exploratory
Sequential Data Analysis, described in greater detail in the next section.
As is the case in most studies of communication, in which the process of measurement relies
on humans, rather than machines, the statistical analysis was performed on both
quantitative and qualitative data, i.e. nominal, categorical, data (see Kennedy, 1983, for a
discussion of data types in general, and nominal data in particular). In the measurement of
non-verbal activity, the data consisted of duration of action, e.g., time spent manipulating
the display. The primary reason for choosing time of activity - rather than, for example,
number of actions - was that no clear semantic scheme was found for labeling activity, and
thus the count of individual actions seemed impossible. For example, in performing a ten-
item checklist procedure, some pilots reached for the display five times and touched it,
withdrawing their hand for a brief instant between touches, while others left their hand
"hovering" over the surface of the display throughout the entire checklist, making slight
input movements which were virtually undetectable on the video records. It was thus
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decidedto measure the time spent interacting with the display - i.e., the duration of time a
pilot spent engaged in display manipulation - rather than the particular number of times the
display was touched. The verbal data were transcribed and categorized, and analysis
involving these data examined the frequency of occurrence of intra-crew, in-cockpit, Speech
Acts (Levinson, 1983).
In order to better understand the impact of checklist design on different task scenarios, five
key segments were identified along the leg. The first was performance of the After Start
checklist; the second, the period from the end of that checklist, through taxi, and to the start
of the Before Takeoff checklist; the third, from that point to initiation of the takeoff role; the
fourth, from takeoff to the point at which the birdstrike occurred; and finally, the segment of
flight from birdstrike to landing, including performance of the emergency procedure.
Obviously, the different segments varied in their length; for the purpose of analysis,
wherever appropriate, corrections were made for differences in segment times. Although
the analysis included all phases, the following discussion will focus primarily on the
comparison of the first phase - After Start checklist performance - and the last phase - the
emergency procedure. These two particular phases were chosen because they represent two
very different flight scenarios: the After Start checklist is a well practiced and highly
structured procedure; the emergency procedure was unexpected, and, by virtue of the
ambiguous decision problems it posed, generate much spontaneous crew interaction.
Additionally, throughout the planning of this proposal, it seemed essential to include the
analysis of video recordings by experienced pilots to evaluate and rate pilot and crew
performance. The introduction of human operators into the measurement and analysis
process seems to be an essential step, similar to the use of native speakers for the analysis of
speech communication. The importance of using trained expert observers is confirmed by
Chidester et al. (1989), who discuss the use of experts to detect and recognize errors both in
real-time in the cockpit, as well as after the flight in reviewing videotape records of cockpit
activity. As part of the original study (Palmer & Degani, in preparation), the video tapes
were studied independently by two observes - former airline captains - both of whom were
selected by NASA-Ames ASHFRD as domain experts. They worked independently, and
focused their analysis on performance errors. Their analysis of crew performance in
general, and of performance of the checklist in particular, as well as the ratings provided by
the in-flight observer - will be presented in the Results section. Figure 8 describes the
process of data collection, coding and transcription, and summarizes the dependent
variables upon which the analysis was based.
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Several abbreviations will be used throughout the following sections. The term "SA"
represents "speech-act," specifically, intra-crew verbal interactions. The term "NV" will
refer to those non-verbal activities that were coded off the video tapes by the trained coders.
Unless otherwise specified, these will include all four categories of activity: pilots looking
across the cockpit at their crewmembers' display, reaching to manipulate and touching their
own display, pointing in at the display and pointing out at conflicting traffic and landmarks.
"PF" will refer to the pilot flying the plane, and "PNF," to the pilot who was not flying and
was in charge of performing the checklist and other system-related tasks.
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Figure 8: Dependent variables
4. Results
45
4.1. Non-verbal activity
This section begins with a report of the findings concerning effects of checklist design
(Paper, Manual and Auto), pilot's role (PF vs. PNF) and flight phase on the non-verbal
activity observed in the cockpit. The results first consider differences in overall non-verbal
activity, then focus on two mutually exclusive, yet dependent, categories of activity:
manipulation of the checklist display by one pilot, and looking at that display by the other
pilot. Note that in order to correct for differences in duration of flight, the analysis focuses
on the proportion of total flight time during which activity was observed in the cockpit, i.e.,
the units describe "observed activity time divided by total flight time."
* Effect of checklist design on non-verbal activities: An analysis of the effect of checklist
condition on total time of non-verbal cockpit activity - normalized by dividing that time by
the total flight time - yielded a significant difference between the three groups (F2,23=5.036;
p<.02), as shown in Figure 9. A pairwise comparison using the Tukey test yielded a
significant difference (at p=.05) between the Paper condition and the Manual condition, with
pilots in the Paper condition performing fewer observable actions. The two electronic
conditions of Manual and Auto did not differ significantly (p>0.1).
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Effect of checklist design on non-verbal activity
Since three of the four NV categories were specifically related to the checklist display, and
since the checklist interface located at the bottom half of the touch-sensitive CRT display
was interactive only for the two Electronic groups - it is not surprising that crews in these
groups were seen to be more active than crews in the Paper group. The lack of a significant
difference between the Manual and Auto group is surprising, given that the automation was
designed to assume a large portion of the pilots' checklist activities.
• Effects of checklist design and pilot's role on display manipulation: A two-way ANOVA was
used to test the effect of condition and pilot's role on the proportion of time at which pilots
manipulated the checklist display, using [(TouchTime+PointTime)/Legtime] as the
dependent measure; to reflect the interdependence of crewmembers, PF and PNF were
blocked by crew. As can be seen in Figure 10, there was a main effect for both condition
(F2,9=5.43, p<.01) and role (F1,9=75.98; p<.001). A significant interaction effect was also
observed (F2,9=9.25; p<.01). The PNFs spent more time than their crew-members
manipulating the checklist display; this finding is not surprising, given that their role in the
crew specified that they be the ones performing the checklist. Similarly expected was the
effect of condition on the PNF's activities, in which the PNFs using the Manual checklist
interacted with their display more than the two other groups: more than the Paper group
due to the interface, and more than the Auto group due to lack of automation.
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Figure 10: Effects of checklist design and pilot's role on display manipulation
• Effect of checklist design on PNF's display manipulation: Following the above finding, a more
focused comparison of the PNF's display manipulation times between the three groups
(dashed line in Figure 10) yielded a significant effect (F2,11=12.98; p<.01). Further pairwise
comparisons using the Tukey test yielded a significant (at p=.01) difference between the
Paper and the two other groups, but no difference between the two Electronic groups. This
finding also confirms what is evident from Figure 10, that is, that the difference in activity
between the three conditions detected in the data described in Figure 9 is attributable
primarily to the difference in activities of the PNFs.
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• Effect of checklist design and pilot's role on monitoring other's display: In order to determine
the effect of checklist interface and task on the proportion of time at which each pilot looked
across the cockpit at the other pilot's display, a two way ANOVA (Condition x Role) was
performed on LookTime/Legtime (Figure 11); PF and PNF were blocked by crew. While no
main effect was observed, the interaction between the two factors was marginally significant
(F2,9=3.14; p=.09).
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Effect of checklist design and pilot's role on looking at other's display
Crews in the Manual condition seemed to be the main reason for the interaction, with PFs in
this condition looking much more than PFs in the two other groups, while PNFs looked less.
Given the above findings (Figure 10) suggesting that the PNFs in the Manual group were
busier manipulating their display than the PNFs from the two other groups, it may be
reasonable to speculate that while the Manual PNFs' workload - greater than the other
groups because of the absence of automation - did not allow them to look at their crew
member's display as much, the activity they displayed lead their PFs to look at them more
than PFs from other conditions. Interestingly, the PNFs from the Paper and Auto groups
looked across the cockpit more than their PFs. An ANOVA testing the effect of role for
these two conditions yielded a significantly larger amount of "looks" for PNFs (F1,14=5.208;
p=.04).
• Effect of condition on PF's looking activity: Focusing the analysis of the "look" behavior on
the PFs (solid line, Figure 11), an ANOVA testing the effect of condition on look time
yielded a significant difference between the groups (F2,9=5.692; p<.05). A pairwise
comparison using the Tukey test identified a significant difference (at p=.05) between the
Manual group and the two other groups, but not between the Paper and Automatic group.
Following the argument proposed above, this finding makes sense: since there was more
activity displayed by the PNFs of the Manual group, there was more information for the PFs
of that group to gain from looking across the cockpit at their crewmember's display.
• The probability of transition from one's "touch" to another's "look": The relationship between
expected and observed probabilities of observing a "look" following a "touch" is presented in
Figure 12. In order to test whether the non-verbal behavior of touching one's own display
may predict a cross-cockpit look from the other pilot, MacShapa (Sanderson, 1993) was used
to perform a lag sequential analysis on the entire non-verbal data stream. This analysis
focused on whether a pilot tended to look at their crewmember's display immediately after
that crewmember manipulated that display; thus, the analysis focused on events that follow
each other immediately, without any intervening events.
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Of the twelve crews which made up the three groups, 9 crews - three of four from each
experimental group - yielded Markov Z scores that suggest that the observed probability of
"look" following "touch" was significantly higher (at the p=.05 level) than expected by
chance (see Faraone and Dorfman, 1987, for a description of the Markov Z statistic). While
the nature of lag sequential analysis requires that caution be used in drawing conclusions
about actual sequences (Gottman & Roy, 1990), this finding further confirmed the close
connection between activity by one pilot and the monitoring of that activity by the other.
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Figure 12: Expected and observed probabilities of transition from
one pilot's display manipulation to the other's looking at that display
• Effect of condition and role on concurrence of look and touch: Finally, in an attempt to identify
the connection between one pilot's activity and the other pilot's looking at that activity, the
analysis focused on the amount of time spent looking at the display while the other pilot
manipulated it, as a proportion of the total amount of time spent looking at that display (see
Figure 13).
A two-way ANOVA (Condition x Role), in which PF and PNF were blocked by crew,
yielded a marginal main effect for condition (F2,9=3.885; p--.06) and a main effect for role
(F1,9=28.64; p<.001). There was also a marginal interaction effect (F2,9--3.89; p=.06), though
this seems to be due specifically to the lack of any change across conditions for the PNF's.
From this data it seems that the PF's of both Electronic conditions spent most of their time -
over 50% - looking across at their PNF's display while it was being manipulated. This
suggests that beyond the information provided by the display itself, these pilots were
specifically looking for information provided by the dynamic interaction between their
crewmembers and the display.
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Figure 14: Variations in non-verbal activity across two flight phases
• Differences across flight phases: To examine the effect of the different flight phases on non-
verbal activity, a two-way, repeated measures, ANOVA (Condition x Phase) was conducted,
looking at the time of non-verbal activity (corrected for differences in phase times). Recall
that this contrast compared the highly routinized After Start checklist phase with the
unexpected emergency phase which followed the birdstrike (see Figure 14). The ANOVA
yielded a main effect for condition (F2,9=4.69; p<.05) and phase (F1,9=72.61; p<.001). There
was no interaction between the variables.
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Note that since activity for both crewmembers was coded separately, then summed up for
each crew, the measured ratio may indeed exceed 1, as it did for the two electronic groups in
the early phase of the flight. The pattern across phases is not surprising, since the After Start
checklist phase was relatively short and rigidly structured to include much activity, while
the emergency phase took much longer, and included the return to landing segment in
which not much was performed. The primary reason for presenting these data is for later
discussion of effects of flight phase.
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Figure 15: Distribution of activity across different flight phases
• Effect of checklist design and flight phase on distribution of non-verbals A two-way, repeated
measures, ANOVA testing the effect of condition and phase on the proportion of total non-
verbal activity performed in each phase (NV-in-phase/total NV) yielded a main effect for
condition (F2,9=5.54; p<.05) and phase (F1,9=186.22; p<.001); there was a significant
interaction between condition and phase (F2,9=7.28; p<.02). As is shown in Figure 15, while
all three groups performed a large proportion of their activity in the emergency phase of the
flight, the two Electronic groups seem to display a relatively larger proportion of activity in
that phase. This difference is most noticeable for the Auto, which goes from lowest portion
of activity in the earlier phase to the highest in the later phase. A similar trend can be seen
in the Manual data; the Paper group displayed the most moderate slope of all three.
Reviewing the above findings concerning non-verbal activity, several patterns seem to
emerge. Overall, the Paper group tended to display less cockpit activity than the two
Electronic groups; within the Electronic conditions, the Manual crews tended to engage in
more control and monitoring activity than the Automatic crews. For all three groups, the
pilots' roles in the crew had a significant impact on the type and quantity of activity, with
PNFs tending to engage in more control inputs while PFs engage in more monitoring
behavior. The connection between these two activities - which, by virtue of being
distributed between the two pilots, may provide insight to their cooperation strategies -
proved to be quite strong, as indicated by the high probability of observing a transition from
one's touch to another's look as well as by the large ratio of concurrent looking to total
looking. Here, in particular, the data show an increased ratio for both Electronic groups,
suggesting that the added amount of non-verbal activity may be supporting the pilots'
reliance on monitoring and consequential communication.
It is important to note that since the analysis focused only on pilots' looks at the checklist
display, the data probably represents the lower measure of the true number of cross-cockpit
looks which are occurring. Indeed, throughout the video coding sessions, pilots were seen
to look at other pilots interacting with systems which were located in different places in the
cockpit, e.g., on the overhead panel, or the pedestal console between the two pilots. Given
the large range of locations of activity, and, consequently, the large range of possible looks
across the cockpit, and since the only difference in cockpit design between the three
conditions was in the functionality of the checklist display, all control activity and cross-
cockpit looks that were not directly related to that system were not coded, and were not
included in the analysis.
Finally, the difference in distribution of activity over different flight phases indicates that
while automation supported reduced activity under normal flight conditions, it elicited a
relatively higher proportion of activity under emergency flight conditions.
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4.2. Verbalutterances
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In this section, a brief analysis of verbal communication first looks for fundamental
differences between the three experimental groups, then at the effects that different flight
phases exerted on these groups. A subsequent analysis of in-cockpit verbal data focused
primarily on the relationship between verbal and non-verbal activity, the findings of which
are discussed in the next section.
The verbal transcripts were used to measure both frequency and duration of in-cockpit
Speech Acts. Preliminary data analysis tested the comparative value of using one as
opposed to the other; when virtually identical results were yielded for both, it was decided
that the measure of frequency of Speech Acts be used consistently throughout all analyses
involving verbal transcripts.
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Figure 16: Effects of checklist design on rate of speech
* Effect of checklist design on number of Speech Acts: The three groups did not differ in the
rates of verbal communication within the cockpit (Figure 16). An ANOVA performed on
the number of in-crew communication speech acts, adjusted for the variance in the length of
flight time (Speech Acts / leg time) yielded no significant difference between groups (F2,9 =
0.321; p=.73).
• Effects of condition and flight phase on distribution of Speech Acts: Since no difference was
apparent in overall speech rate, it was interesting to see whether the different groups
distributed their speech throughout the flight in a similar pattern. A two-way, repeated
measures, ANOVA (Condition x Phase) was performed, using (speech-acts in phase / total
speech-acts) as the dependent measure (see Figure 17). A main effect for phase was found
(F1,9=409.01; p<.001), as well as a Condition x Phase interaction effect (F2,9=6.76; p<.02).
The main effect was expected, since the emergency procedure phase lasted considerably
longer than the initial after-start checklist phase. The interaction effect suggests that when
the task was well defined, the Auto allowed performance of the task with minimal verbal
interaction; in the emergency procedure, however, crews in the Auto condition performed
the task using a relatively higher amount of in-cockpit communications, suggesting a less
balanced distribution of speech across the flight.
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Figure 17: Proportion of Speech Acts uttered in two different flight phases
4.3. Relationshipbetweenverbalandnon-verbal
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• Effects of checklist design and role on NV/SA: In order to determine the relative occurrence of
non-verbal and verbal activity, the total time of observable non-verbals was divided by the
number of in-crew verbal utterances. A two-way ANOVA, in which pilots were blocked by
crew, testing for the effect of condition and role on the ratio of NV/SA yielded a significant
main effect for condition (F2,9=5.05; p<.05) and for role (F1,9=258.12 p<.001). There was
also an interaction effect (F2,9=9.95; p<.001). Overall, as shown in Figure 18, the PNFs
performed more non-verbal activity in relation to their speech than did the PFs. For both
crew members, the crews in the Electronic condition seemed to have a larger ratio of non-
verbals to verbals than did the Paper crews, with the Manual exhibiting the highest
action/speech-act ratio. It was established earlier that the groups differed in NV activity
(Figure 9), and that they did not differ in SA activities (Figure 16), hence the relationship
described here may seem obvious. Nevertheless, it was important to establish the difference
between the groups along this fundamental measure.
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Figure 18: Effect of checklist design and pilot's role on
ratio of non-verbal activity and Speech Acts
This analysis emphasizes the point that the Electronic interface created a task environment
in which both pilots were more active than the Paper pilots without a concurrent increase in
the amount of in-cockpit verbal communication. Since the analysis of cross-cockpit looks
validated that PFs indeed looked at these actions, the Electronic checklist can be seen as
providing added information in the form of consequential communication.
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• Effect of checklist design andflight phase on NV/SA: A two-way, repeated measures, ANOVA
testing the effect of condition and phase on NV/SA yielded a main effect for condition
(F2,9=5.99; p<.03) and phase (F1,9=53.26; p<.001), and no interaction effect (see Figure 19).
In general, the ratio of NV/SA was higher in the normal checklist phase than in the
emergency checklist phase; in comparing the three different design conditions, the two
Electronic groups exhibited more activity relative to speech acts than the Paper group.
These data should be considered in the context of the data presented in Figure 17 above,
which suggested that the two Auto crew members performed a large proportion of their
total speech acts in the emergency condition. While the Paper and Manual crews were
virtually identical in the proportional distribution of speech acts across the two phases
(Figure 15), the ratio of non-verbal to verbal yielded a greater similarity between the two
Electronic groups, with the Paper group scoring lower than both, across both phases of
flight.
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Figure 19: Variations in activity/speech ratio across different flight phases
In summary,it seemsthat the overall rate of speech in the cockpit was affected neither by
checklist design, nor by the pilots' different roles within the crews. This finding alone is
interesting, since automation of the checklist was designed to alleviate some of the workload
on the crew, and presumably, could have made some intra-crew speech redundant. Since
the crews did vary in the amount of non-verbal activity in the cockpit, it is interesting that
the increase in activity was not accompanied by an equal increase - or decrease - in speech.
One possible interpretation is that the information inherent in activity provided the
Electronic crews with sufficient communication material to make added speech
unnecessary.
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4.4. Performance
As was described in the Methodology (section 3), crew performance was measured in three
different manners: 1) During the flight, an in flight observer - who had accompanied all
crews throughout all their missions - rated the crews for performance; 2) Following the
flights, two independent observers went over the video recordings, and rated each crew and
crew member for performance; 3) A global performance measure relating to performance
of the emergency checklist - and, specifically, to whether the crew shut-down the wrong
engine - was used by Mosier (1992) in her analysis of crew performance. As will become
evident from the following discussion, there was no agreement between the different raters
regarding the performance of the different crews. This seems due primarily to the structure
of the performance rating scales defined by the original investigators (Palmer and Degani, in
preparation).
• Performance ratings by observer: The three checklist groups - Paper, Manual and Auto -
were rated for performance of different aspects of crew cooperation by the in-flight observer
(see Figure 20). A one-way ANOVA testing the effect of condition on these ratings yielded a
marginal difference (F2,47=2.463; p=.097). Subsequent pairwise comparisons yielded a
significant difference (at p<.05) between the Paper and Auto crews (F1,31--4.1; p=.05). The
Manual crews did not differ significantly from either. The mere fact that there was a trend
for difference between the three conditions is interesting, since the particular measures
discussed here addressed "crew communication," "management style" and "coordination,"
variables which theoretically should not have been affected by level of automation.
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Figure 20: Performance ratings by in-flight expert observer
• Correlations: In order to test the degree of relationship between performance and
transcribed variables for all 12 crews, a correlation matrix was constructed, and coefficients
calculated (Table 2). Note that although the above analysis of NVs indicates a significant
difference in performance between the groups, no relationship was found between these
measures of activity and performance measures. At the same time, while the three groups
showed no significant difference in the rate of Speech Acts within the cockpit, these were
found to be negatively correlated with performance measures. It seems that, at least from
the perspective of the in-flight observer, crews that performed the task with less speech
rated higher on measures such as communication, interpersonal style and crew atmosphere
and coordination.
Variable _ SA/leg_ime NV/SA
Overall performance -.011 -.632* .339
Communication -.008 -.507 .276
Interpersonal style -.064 -.709** .317
Atmosphere and
coordination -.026 -.652* .33
[Note: Based on n=12. "12<.05; *'12<.01]
Table 2: Pearson correlations of performance measures and transcribed NVs and SAs
Since another source for performance ratings focused on crew's performance in the
emergency phase of flight (see discussion of Mosier's study below), a detailed analysis of the
in-flight observer's ratings focused on that particular high-workload phase of flight. The in-
flight observer had rated individual crewmembers for performance during each phase of the
flight, again, rating their performance in a set of prescribed categories along a scale of I to 5.
Figure 21 presents the data pertaining to three categories of behavior: Situational
Awareness, Workload Distribution, and Communication and Coordination. ANOVAs
comparing the ratings for the three groups yielded significant differences for the ratings of
Situational Awareness (F2,23=4.433; p=0.02) and Workload Distribution (F2,22=3.874;
p=0.04); there was a marginal difference in ratings of Communication & Coordination
(F2,23=2.579; p=0.1). Overall, the Manual group rated lower than either Paper or Auto;
pairwise comparisons did not yield a significant advantage for the Auto over the Paper.
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Figure 21: Performance ratings for emergency phase (individual pilots)
• Video raters: Following the flights, two independent raters watched the videos recorded
during the sessions, rating crews and individual pilots according to a performance rating
scale defined by Palmer and Degani (in preparation). Subsequent analysis of these ratings
yielded no systematic differences between their respective ratings of the three groups, nor
any meaningful correlation between the scores given to the same crews by the two raters.
Both raters tended to give crews and individual pilots the score of "3" on a scale of 1-5, and
therefore the variance in ratings was too small to enable analysis. The scale apparently did
not have enough gradations to tease-out whatever differences in performance were indeed
perceived. Because of this low variance, neither rater's scores correlated significantly with
the in-flight observer's performance ratings. This data were quite useless, and was not used
for any further analysis.
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• Kathy Mosier: In her paper describing the decision processes within the crews, Mosier
(1992) found that the mean number of informational items discussed by the crews decreased
as the checklist became more automated. This finding is interesting, as the data from the
current analysis indicate that the overall number of in-cockpit communications did not
differ. Since the current analysis did not look at any form of content analysis of the verbal
transcriptions, and since Mosier focused her analysis on a count of speech acts with
"informational value," it seems important to note the relationship between total amount of
verbal communication and the "informational value" of that communication.
Mosier also found that as the automation of the checklist increased, the crews were more
likely to perform the wrong action in response to the birdsrike emergency. She used the
decision to shut-down an engine in response to the engine fire warning as a criteria for task
performance: leaving both engines on was considered good performance, while shutting
one engine was considered poor. Accordingly, she rated the Paper crews as high
performers (1 of 4 crews shut down an engine), the Elec. Manual crews as medium (2 of 4
crews such down an engine), and the Elec. Automatic crews as poor (3 of 4 crews shut down
and engine, though one crew immediately re-started that engine). These findings, however,
seem to conflict with the current analysis of crew performance, as rated by the in-flight
observer; they were not confirmed, nor opposed, by the performance ratings provided by
the video raters. A comparison of crews that shut down an engine with crews that did not
yielded no significant difference along non-verbal or Speech Act measures (p>.l). When
comparing the proportion of total speech activity performed in the emergency phase of
flight, the crews that shut down an engine were observed to perform a larger portion of
their speech (.577) than the crews that kept both engines on (.446); this difference was
statistically significant (F1,11 -- 29.14; p<.001). Whether the increase in total speech was the
cause, or result of, the inappropriate engine shutdown cannot easily be determined.
Overall, with all ratings in mind, it seems that the performance measures were not designed
with sufficient care to detect meaningful differences between the three groups. The lack of
variance in performance ratings by the video raters is disappointing. Further, the absence of
additional ratings leaves the in-flight observer's performance ratings without support, thus
lacking a sense of perspective. Within these constraints, several interesting issues did
emerge. The significantly higher ratings for the Auto is interesting, particularly since this
group demonstrated an intermediate level of NVs, i.e., more than the Paper, but less than
the Manual. Further, since the groups did not vary in the amount of in-cockpit speech, the
strong negative relationship between performance measures and SAs suggests that the rater
based his appraisal of performance on some other elements. The differences with Mosier's
findings are not too surprising: her binary performance measure (engine on vs. engine off)
did not really allow for much variance, and her focus on analysis of speech content did not
include the various activity variables used in this study. These performance issues, along
with the results pertaining to non-verbal activity and verbal communication, are discussed
in detail in the following section.
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5. Discussion
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5.1. Non-verbal activity
The measurement and analysis of non-verbal behavior in the cockpit was the focal point of
this research. The coding scheme - which examined the four visible actions of look, touch,
point-in and point-out - succeeded in capturing differences between the three conditions
defined by checklist design. The scheme also captured differences resulting from the
different roles pilots played during the flight, i.e., the difference between PF and PNF. The
fundamental difference in the three groups' overall level of activity (Figure 9) should not be
surprising. The data are consistent with the connection between technology and task
performance previously made (e.g., Hulin & Roznowski, 1985; McGrath & Hollingshead,
1993; Kiesler & Sproull, 1992). In an earlier section (1.3.4.), and in earlier theoretical
discussions (Segal, 1990), the concept of design as choreography was proposed, suggesting
that variations in interface design could directly shape an operator's physical behavior. The
non-verbal data presented in Figure 9 - which was, by definition, based on physical behavior
only - supports this concept. The finding of higher levels of activity in the Electronic
cockpits is consistent with, and may partially explain, the findings of Wiener et al. (1991),
who argue that in spite of some of the obvious advantages of the glass cockpit, the workload
in a modem cockpit (in their case, an MD-88) could become excessive.
The data show that, in spite of the fact that the specific number of action items for any given
checklist procedure was identical for all three groups, the two Electronic groups were
observed to interact more with the system. This pattern is largely due to the Electronic
crews' need to interact with the display to perform actions related to control of the checklist
itself, such as call up a checklist page, acknowledge that an item was performed or clear a
completed screen; pilots in the Paper group simply read items off a printed page. Recall
that approximately 70% of the items on any given checklist were automated in the Auto
condition; it is interesting, therefore, that the Manual group did not exhibit a significantly
greater rate of activity than the Auto group. A difference in activity level and resultant use
of non-verbal communication was predicted in Hypothesis 1. (section 3.3); this predicted
difference was not found. The lack of difference between these two groups suggests that
most of the pilots' interactions with the touch-sensitive displays concerned "meta" control of
the checklist itself - e.g., paging through modes, going through menus - rather than inputs
relating to checklist content.
Wiener has repeatedly argued (e.g., 1988) that automated equipment does not appear to live
up to its expectations in reducing workload, since while the manual tasks may be declining,
monitoring and mental workload have increased. The data presented here suggest that
even at the physical level of manual interaction with the system, workload is not alleviated
by automation (Figure 9). This is not surprising, as the interaction of the pilots with this
particular automated system was designed to require manual interactions with the touch-
sensitive displays. Both this system and the systems described by Wiener rely on manual
interface for operator control of automated system, requiring manual inputs for such
activities as activation, mode selection and message confirmation. Later in this section, the
potential benefits and costs of the Electronic groups' added engagement with the system
will be discussed.
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Within each crew, the difference in the two pilots' respective roles was also dearly reflected
in the non-verbal data. Looking at the two non-verbal behaviors that were directly linked to
control of the checklist display - touching the display and pointing at it - the differential
effect of checklist design on each pilot are apparent (Figure 10). The clear distinction
between Pilot Not Flying and Pilot Flying created a situation in which one pilot - the PNF -
did the majority of system control activity, while the other - the PF - was seen to be doing
little other than fly the aircraft. Note that the difference in checklist design is reflected only
in the PNFs' control activities, as they were the ones in charge of checklist performance. In
this sense, the PFs may serve as a baseline for comparison: since the task of flying the
aircraft, and the design of the flight controls, were identical for all three groups, there was
essentially no difference observed in the rate of the PFs' activities in the cockpit. The PNFs,
however, through interacting with either a paper checklist, or one of two touch-sensitive
interfaces, displayed levels of activity which accurately reflected the design and
functionality of the interface. These variation in PNFs activities seem to be the primary
reason for the overall difference in cockpit activity shown in Figure 9.
Turning to the non-verbal measure that focused on the pilots' monitoring behavior - i.e., the
measure of looking across the cockpit at a crewmember's checklist display - an opposite, yet
somewhat similar, pattern emerges (Figure 11). Here, the difference between the groups
was reflected by the significant difference in the PF's looking behavior; the PNF's did not
vary in the rate of looking over at the PF's display. The data begin to suggest the role played
l_y non-verbal, consequential, communication. Just as an earlier study of video-mediated
communication identifies the value of mutual visual access in providing individuals with
valuable information regarding task coordination (Heath and Luff, 1992), the "look" data
may be driven by the pilots' attempts to pick up task-relevant information. These findings
are also consistent with Chapanis et al.'s observation that when multiple operators work in
the same room, the modality of their communication changes, to include more visual
exchange (1972); similar observations were made by Rochlin et al. (1987). Barber (1983)
explains this phenomena as one operator's expectancy of another's technical competence,
where monitoring is performed to confirm this expectancy. In the context of the above
discussion of differences in the PNFs' activities shown in Figure 10, these visible differences
may be providing the pilots from the three groups with a differential incentive to look
across the cockpit at their crewmember's display: the pattern of PFs looking over at the
PNFs display (seen in Figure 11) is similar to the pattern of activity displayed by the PNFs
(seen in Figure 10). It should be noted, however, that due to the unclear nature of the
performance data, a strong causal connection between consequential communication and
quality of task performance cannot be made.
While PFs in the Manual crews spent more time looking across the cockpit than PNFs, this
difference was reversed for the two other conditions. Recall that in Figure 10, PNFs in the
Paper and the Auto conditions were busier manipulating the system than their respective
PFs; these same pilots also did more looking across the cockpit than their PFs (Figure 11).
This finding is intriguing, and suggests that the rate at which pilots looked across the
cockpit, in and of itself, did not necessarily capture the differences in checklist design which
were impacting the rate of display-related, non-verbal, activity. It thus seemed essential that
the analysis focus on the relationship between the two measures of control inputs and
monitoring. The analysis first examined the particular temporal relationship between one's
look and another's activity. The lag sequential analysis confirmed that the relationship
between the two behaviors was not coincidental. When looking at the entire sequence of
behaviors in the cockpit, these two particular activities were shown to be strongly related.
Specifically, the lag sequential analysis showed that one pilot's reach for the display was
highly likely to be followed by the other pilot's turn to look at that display (Figure 12). This
finding was supported with the measure of concurrence between one pilot's touch and
another's look (Figure 13): on average, across all three conditions, almost half (48%) the time
that PFs looked over at PNF's display, the latter were busy interacting with that display.
These data nicely reflect differences between the level of activity of the PNFs in the three
groups: concurrence for Paper alone was relatively low (12.5%), while for both Manual and
Auto, concurrence was significantly higher (60% and 72%, respectively). Note that the ratio
of the Manual and Auto PFs' concurrent looks to the Paper PFs' concurrent looks -
approximately 5 to 1 - was much higher than the ratio of Manual and Auto PNFs' activities
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to Paper PNFs' activities, which was approximately 3 to 1. This suggests that the higher rate
of concurrent looks in the electronic cockpits was not simply a result of the higher level of
activity in the cockpit, but was triggered by the visible, physical nature of the PNFs'
interactions with the electronic checklist display.
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In other words, in the Electronic conditions, over half of the time that PFs spent looking over
at their PNF's checklist display was during the PNF's interactions with that display. Given
the low overall "look" time - pilots in the three groups looked across the cockpit at average
only 2.4% of the total flight time (see Figure 11) - it seems reasonable to conclude that the
concurrence of "look" and "touch" was indeed not coincidental. Further, given that PFs in
the Paper and Auto spent little time looking across, it is noteworthy that the measure of
looking in concurrence for Auto was so much higher than that for the Paper. Hutchins and
Palen (1993) argue that the gestures of pilots in a cockpit acquire their meaning by virtue of
being superimposed on the meaningful spatial layout of the panel. It stands to reason that
crewmembers would indeed attempt to follow each other's interactions with different
panels, as these would provide real-time information pertaining to current - and changing -
system states. Since a movement of the head provides a clue for a valuable source of
information (Rasmussen, 1986), these data - which measured pilots' head movements to
identify direction of gaze - may be providing the proof that interactions with the system
were informative for crew coordination.
The relationship between "look" and "touch" is further supported by the lack of effect that
checklist design and automation had on the time that PNFs looked across while the PFs
manipulated their own display. Although, as shown in Figure 11, PNFs did look across the
cockpit, it appears they were unaffected by different checklist interface designs. Further,
there was no concurrence between their looks and the PF's activities (Figure 13). Given the
low rate at which PFs interacted with their own displays (Figure 10), it is not surprising that
the PNFs had no incentive to look at them; this, combined with the added workload that
PNFs had through their own interactions with the system, resulted in effectively no
concurrence between a PF's activity and a PNF's monitoring of that activity. This
asymmetric flow of consequential communication - in which one operator does more
"emitting," while the other does more "detecting," of non-verbal information - was
accurately predicted in Hypothesis 2 (section 3.3).
The comparison of two different flight phases provides further insight to the effects of
interface and automation on non-verbal crew activities. Recall that the comparison
contrastedthe early phase of performing the After Start checklist - a highly routinized task -
with the later phase of coping with the birdstrike, which included fault diagnosis, decision
making and emergency procedures. For all three groups, the rate of activity in the normal
checklist phase was much higher than in the emergency procedure (Figure 14). Since the
normal phase was much shorter than the emergency phase, and since the After Start
procedural task was well-structured and familiar to the crews, this finding is not surprising.
The more interesting question regarding differences across phases concerned the
distribution of activity across the flight. Of all the actions taken by each crew throughout
the entire flight, what portion was taken in each phase? Did checklist design and
automation have a differential impact on this distribution? The data presented in Figure 15
suggests that, indeed, different interfaces resulted in different distributions of cockpit
activity. The Auto crews, who performed a smaller portion of their activities in the normal
checklist phase, performed a larger portion than both other groups in the emergency phase
of the flight. These data are consistent with earlier aviation field studies (Curry, 1985;
Wiener, 1985; Wiener, 1989), where pilots in more "modern" cockpits experienced that while
automation did help in low-workload situations, it actually increased the workload in high
workload situations. Similar results were obtained by Costley et al. (1989), who compared
crew activity in the conventionally instrumented B737-200 with the modernized and
automated B737-300. They had found that in high-workload segments of the flight, crews in
the automated planes showed higher rates of activity (151% as much), while in the lower
workload phase they were slightly less active (90%).
Reviewing the non-verbal activity data, the overall pattern of greater observed activity in
the Electronic cockpits is quite dear. So is the effect of pilot's role on the particular activities
of display manipulation and looking across the cockpit, as well as the strong connection
between display manipulation by one pilot and their being monitored by the other pilot.
These behaviors may impact crew performance in two different ways. On the one hand,
greater visual access of pilots to their crewmembers' activities may promote better
cooperation. This type of crew dynamic has been suggested by McLeod (1992), who
compiled six studies of the effects of Group Support System on group process, finding that
the weight of the evidence suggested that GSS increases equality of participation and
decreases domination by a few individuals. Similarly, the Electronic checklist design, by
causing more interaction between the PNF and the interface, provided the PF with the
opportunity to monitor what was being done and become more involved in that process.
This may be reflected by the relative increase in speech in the decision-making emergency
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phase,a phenomenadiscussedfurther below. From this perspective, the choreography of
greater cockpit activity in the Electronic conditions may be seen as supporting information
exchange in the cockpit, with potential enhancement of crew cooperation.
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On the other hand, one must acknowledge the possible negative effects that highly visible
activity may have on crew performance. Is it possible that the PNF's increased control
activity distracts the PF's attention away from their primary task of flying the aircraft? The
more group members share all of the information they have, the more likely it is that they
will suffer serious information overload (McGrath and Hollingshead, 1993). Recall the
ASKS example #7 described earlier (section 1.3.4.), in which the FO was so busy watching
the Captain's actions that he lost track of his own task. From this perspective, the
choreography of operator activities should take into consideration not only the importance
of rendering certain activities visible, but also the importance of not making activities that
are not important too distracting.
5.2. Speech Acts
Wiener (1993) describes an observation he made in an advanced cockpit (757) on a flight
from Atlanta to Washington National, in which from climb-out until preparation for arrival,
not a word was spoken; the only intra-cockpit communication he could observe was
between each pilot and his CDU. How does the current data support his observation?
The most prominent finding regarding the rate of intra-crew speech acts was the lack of any
difference between the three experimental conditions (Figure 16). Whether looking at rate
or duration of speech acts, no systematic difference was found, even though the coding of
non-verbal activities in the cockpit did show that the three checklist designs elicited
significantly different levels of non-verbal in-cockpit activity (Figure 9). Given this
difference in activity, it seemed reasonable to expect that crews in the two Electronic
conditions - who displayed significantly more activity than Paper crews - would engage in
more verbal exchange; a concurrent increase in activity and speech was shown in previous
studies (e.g., Strauss and Cooper 1989; Costley et al., 1989). Alternatively, a strong
argument for the benefits of non-verbal communication might suggest that crews who are
more active should exhibit less speech activity. This type of relationship between activity
and speech is described by Linde and Shively (1988), who found that crews modulated the
frequency of intra-crew communication according to the workload imposed by the task
scenario: when workload was high, speech was cut down to a minimum, while low
workload enabled the pilots to fill the auditory space. A similar argument was made by
Bowers et al. (1993), whose interpretation of communication and performance data suggests
that crews might utilize workload savings to communicate more frequently.
The finding of no difference in overall speech rate suggests an "attractor state" in the wide
range of speech-act frequencies that may be exhibited during such a flight. In this respect,
the particular flight scenario may be constraining the crews to perform similar rates of
speech acts, regardless of the non-verbal activity in the cockpit. The relationship between
speech and activity, captured by the measure of NV/SA (Figure 18), essentially reflects the
difference in activity described in Figure 9, as well as the effect of role described in Figure
10. It thus seems that the environment - including the difference in checklist interface and
automation - did not directly impact the verbal component of crew interactions. In other
words, the verbal communication component of the global task remained similar in spite of
variations in the demands of non-verbal components of the task. Wiener (1993) does
suggest that since the demands of the modern cockpits may simply be qualitatively
different, higher amounts of conversation may be neither necessary nor desirable. If his use
of "higher" is in any way related to the fact that automation does seem to cause a higher
level of activity, the current data seem to support his assertion.
The distribution of speech across the two different flight phases of normal and emergency
procedures (Figure 17) - and the particular interaction effect of phase and condition - reflect
a pattern discussed earlier regarding distribution of non-verbal activity. As was evident in
the analysis of non-verbal activity across flight phases, we see that the Auto crews
performed the smallest proportion of speech in the standard procedure phase, and the
largest, in the emergency phase. Results from research in Group Support Systems (GSS)
may provide a basis for interpretation of these data. There is considerable evidence that it is
much more difficult for groups to reach consensus using electronic communication,
compared to face-to-face groups (McGrath & Hollingshead, 1993). This argument was
further supported by McLeod (1992) in a review of four lab studies which included 96
groups, in which all findings of measured time to consensus, or time to decision, indicated
that technology-supported groups took longer than unsupported groups. Similarly, in their
study of crews in conventional and automated cockpits, Costley et al. (1989) found that in
high workload conditions, frequency of crew communication was higher in the automated
737-300 cockpit by as much as 27%. What we see in the current data is a relatively larger
increase in speech rates in the automated cockpit when the task required the resolution of a
problem and management of an emergency procedure. Could the pilots be discussing
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control of the automation itself, rather than the actual problem created by engine fire? The
lack of difference in non-verbal activity between the Manual and Auto crews suggests that
much of the activity was indeed directed at management of the automation, rather than at
performing particular items in a procedure. Although a thorough analysis of speech content
would be necessary to determine what specifically was discussed by these crews in each
phase, the relative difference in distribution of speech acts across normal-procedure and
emergency phases suggests that automation - along with the context provided by the
problem solving scenario - did indeed impact the organization of crews' verbal performance,
as it did their non-verbal activity.
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From a methodological perspective, the lack of overall difference between the rate of speech
displayed by the three groups supports the theoretical argument for inclusion of non-verbal
behavior in the measurement and study of crew communication. In spite of the fact that the
different groups differed significantly in their level of activity - and, to a certain extent, in
their task performance - these different levels of activity and performance were not
accompanied by an increase nor a decrease in rate or duration of intra-crew speech
communication. At the same time, it seems clear that pilots did direct their attention at
crew-member activities, suggesting that non-verbal information was flowing in the crew.
The data thus suggest that previous studies that looked at verbal communication alone (e.g.,
Kanki et al., 1989; Foushee & Manos, 1981) may have benefited from including cockpit
activity in their observations.
5.3. Performance
The process of measurement and analysis of crew performance was greatly compromised by
the "piggy-back" nature of this study. Since the current analysis is based on video data
collected by Palmer and Degani (1991), and since the rating of performance by expert
observers was carried out prior to the proposal of this study, the author had little control
over the design of performance scales and actual ratings by the observers. Nevertheless,
there seem to be sufficient sources of performance evaluation from which to draw initial
conclusions.
In an elaborate experiment comparing crew performance under different levels of cockpit
automation and carried out by Wiener et al. (1991), the three measures of crew performance
- as judged by expert raters, instructors and observers - produced few statistically significant
contrasts. The data presented here seem to follow the same pattern: of the three expert
performanceraters,only the in-flight observer'sratings seemedto capture a systematic
differencebetweenthethreeexperimentalgroups. Therating datafor performanceoverthe
entireleg,presentedin Figure20,suggestthat the Electronicinterfacepromotedbettercrew
communication, managementstyle and coordination. Of the two Electronic groups,
automation seemedto promote higher performance ratings. The ratings focusing on
performanceduring the emergencyphase(Figure 21)seemedto reversethe position of
Manual andPapercrews,while continuingto show aslight advantagefor theAuto crews.
Thesetrends conflict with Wiener et al.'s findings (1991),where, whenever significant
performanceresults were found, they favored the lessautomatedDC9 crewsover the
automatedMD88 crews. Other studies have also found that under high task difficulty,
pilots in automatedconditionswereworseat problemsolving than in themanualcondition
(Thorntonetal.,1992;Bowerset al.,1993;Mosier,1992).
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Since Mosier's data was taken from the same video tapes, her findings are most interesting.
Recall that her definition of performance was based on whether the crew shut down an
engine following the birdstrike; a shut down was considered "wrong." Of the twelve crews,
six did shut down; five of these six were flying the Electronic interface. The erroneous
tendency of the more "hi-tech" Electronic crews to shut down an engine is consistent with
the GSS data presented by Kiesler and Sproull (1992), who found that groups that met
through computers were somewhat risk seeking in all circumstances of decision making.
Since the simulated aircraft had only two engines, the decision to shut down one of them
can certainly be seen as risky. How, then, can the conflict between these data and the in-
flight observer's ratings be resolved?
Obviously, the observer's data may simply be wrong. This seems to be an easy solution,
albeit one that does not account for the observer's high level of expertise and extensive
experience as a performance evaluator for NASA. There may be an alternative way of
interpreting the data, though. Dividing the 12 crews to two groups along Mosier's
performance measure regarding engine shut down (1992) showed that the low-performing
crews exhibited a significantly larger proportion of speech acts in the emergency phase.
This seems consistent with the finding of negative correlations between performance
measures and rate of speech acts, presented in Table 2. While the lack of difference between
the three groups' global speech rate suggests that the relationship between performance and
speech may be defined by other variables that were not included in the measurement and
analysis process, the distribution of speech across different flight phases suggests that the
in-flight observer may have been picking up local differences in speech and performance
which were consistent with Mosier's findings.
It is essential to note, though, that performance rating according to one criteria only, such as
the "engine shut down" measure used by Mosier, clearly does not reflect the complexities
involved in performance of this type of task. For example, a strong argument can be made
that since the birdstrike occurred immediately after takeoff, a quick return for landing is the
most obvious correct response to the problem. In fact, many pilot training programs
emphasize the advantages of, when possible, solving problems on the ground rather than in
mid-air. From this perspective, the crews who returned fastest for landing performed best.
If one follows this assumption, rank-ordering the 12 crews according to total legtime
produces an entirely different performance picture: of the six fast_st crews to return to
landing, five were from the Electronic interface conditions (3 from Manual and 2 from
Auto). This illustrates the lack of stability of any binary performance measure and, once
again, suggests that more thorough analysis of performance is needed before conclusions
are drawn.
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5.4. Team Engagement State Space (TESS) - a qualitative interpretation
Figure 22 presents a simple application of the TESS model proposed earlier (section 1.3.3.) to
the analysis of the non-verbal and verbal video data. Recall that, in the initial description of
TESS, the intention was to describe a crew's performance in a way that captures the
interaction between the control and the communication tasks. Since the promotion of non-
verbal activity as communication argues that the control and communication are integrated,
the variables plotted on each axis reflect the assumptions that integration was indeed
captured by the data. The vertical axis (Y) shows the rate of observed non-verbal cockpit
activity, i.e., the direct interactions of individual pilots with the display. Based on the
assumption that certain types of non-verbal activity are specifically informative, the
horizontal (X) axis shows the sum of what were assumed to be "communicatory" behaviors:
rate of speech, rate of pointing and rate of looking over at a crewmember's activity. Each
data point reflects these two measures for each pilot, whether PF or PNF. The data points
are coded by shape to reflect the particular condition, or checklist design, to which that pilot
belonged; a "-" symbol identifies the data points for PFs. The legend provides the mapping
between symbol and group; note that group means are also displayed.
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Figure 22: Application of TESS model for data analysis
Looking first at the group means, the plot reflects one of the most interesting findings
concerning the effects of interface design on task performance and crew coordination. The
Electronic interface created a task environment in which pilots performed more interactions
with the system without a noticeable increase or decrease in communication activity. Both
of these groups show greater variance in control activity than the Paper, while the variance
in communication activity for all three groups is very similar. The Paper pilots seem to
differ primarily along the communication component of the task; it seems that the paper
checklist did not cause substantial differences between pilots in the system control task.
Figure 23 provides an interesting perspective on the distribution of activity between the two
crew members, by connecting the data-point for PF and PNF for each crew. Note that for
the Manual crews, the unequal distribution of control activity between the two pilots was
quite clear, as can be seen from the strong vertical component of the vectors connecting the
crew members. At the same time, the Manual pilots show little variance in communication
activity. The Paper crews - as a result of less variance in control activity, and more variance
in communication activity - have the shallowest vectors; the Auto crews, an intermediate
pattern. From this perspective, it seems that the design of the conventional Paper checklist
and the Automated electronic checklist resulted in a more equal distribution of control
activity than did the hybrid electronic Manual checklist. Note also that for most crews, the
slope is positive, i.e., the PNFs were doing more of both control and Communication
activities.
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This cursory analysis highlights the advantages and drawbacks of modern interface designs
and automation. The conventional paper checklist seems to allow the task to be performed
with minimal interactions with the system, thus reducing the opportunity for input error.
Indeed, the shallow nature of the Paper crews' vectors seems to be partially a result of an
apparent "floor effect" in control activity. Automation of the checklist increases input
activity by virtue of imposing on the pilots the task of interacting with the interface in the
process of "communicating" with the automated system; at the same time, it provides an
added level of security, since the system continuously tracks the pilots' performance of the
checklist procedures. Simply providing a modern interface without automation - which was
the case with the Manual - increases the workload of the control task to the highest degree,
but does not afford the advantages inherent in automation.
Recall, though, that the added activity exhibited by the two electronic groups seemed to
trigger cross-cockpit looks from crew members. This suggests that while workload may
indeed have been higher in the Manual condition than in the Paper condition, the Manual
crews may have benefited from the redundancy afforded by the PFs' monitoring of the
PNFs' interactions with the checklist display. Since performance measures did not identify
errors of input - and recovery from such errors - this assumption needs to be further tested.
Overall, a visual analysis of the TESS suggests that variations in interface design and
automation seem to impose increased workload on manual activity without an equal
increase in the load on the crews to communicate and coordinate task performance. Insofar
as increased manual workload may afford information that can be observed by a crew
member, it may enhance the overall reliability of crew performance.
5.5. Potential applications and future research
The results presented above seem to support the two primary thrusts of the theoretical
concepts which inspired this research. Differences in checklist interface design resulted in a
clear difference in non-verbal activity between the Paper and the two electronic conditions.
This difference validates the notion of designer as choreographer. This, in and of itself,
would not be too important had the results not shown that pilots do indeed monitor each
other's non-verbal interactions with the system. The strong connection between one pilot's
activities and the other's monitoring suggests that the choreographed control "dance" does
indeed contain information that is noted by the pilots. Thus, the findings support the notion
that it is incumbent upon designers to consider the impact that interface design might have
on crew coordination.
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Since the activity of one operator may cause another to look over at the location of activity,
several broad design guidelines may be defined. It would certainly be useful to build upon
this phenomena in order to encourage the monitoring of actions that may have critical
consequences on the task. Hence, if a task analysis identifies certain actions that demand
not only the attention of one operator, but rather, the redundant attention of other operators,
such actions should be choreographed to take place in a manner and location that afford
visual access to the entire crew. Conversely, the attentional demands of monitoring may be
distracting to operators involved in the performance of critical task components. From this
perspective, it seems important to identify those task elements that are so uncritical that
they need not be monitored, and to design them so that they do not impose added workload
on those operators who are not directly in charge of their completion.
The "informational value" of observed non-verbal activity needs to be identified and
defined. This could possibly be done by constructing scenarios where particular actions by
one operator are designed to elicit a specified response from another operator; thorough
debriefing and interviews may provide further information regarding the semantic value
afforded by observing different activities. It also remains to be determined at what
accuracy, or resolution, pilots actually pick up control manipulations. One of the drawbacks
of touch-sensitive technology is that it renders all control activities similar, namely, all
controls involve pressing the display. Under these conditions, switching a system from "off'
to "on," or vise versa, entail identical movements on part of the operator. If the displays are
not designed to explicitly make the resultant changes in the system visible and
discriminable, the touch-sensitive interface will eliminate the variability in control actions
which exists in traditional cockpits, e.g., flip-up vs. flip-down, pull vs. push, turn vs. slide
(for a discussion of the importance of visibility in design, see Norman, 1988). To the extent
that such subtle control motions are perceived and used by other pilots, the particular
designs used in this experiment did not enable information at this level of detail to emerge.
Measurement and analysis at this scale can be expected to involve sophisticated video
technology, as well as rigorous coding procedures that may capture differences in pilot-
control interactions and crewmember reactions. It seems that such a procedure would be
possible only under simulated flight conditions, where both system design and task scenario
provide the researchers with maximum, and precise, control.
The findings support the argument that designing multi-operator crew-machine interfaces is
fundamentally different from the design of single-operator human-machine interfaces. As
the majority of applied aviation human factors research and data focus on the measurement
and analysis of the interaction between a single pilot and his/her cockpit interface, it seems
essential that the unique aspects of designing for crews be studied and established in greater
depth. Since the study of cockpit crew factors, e.g., crew dynamics and decision making
processes, has focused primarily on the measurement and analysis verbal interactionsi
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resultantfindingshavefocusedprimarily on training, ratherthan on concrete design issues.
The inclusion of non-verbal measures as fundamental elements in the process of crew
communication will enable designers of large, multi-operator, cockpits to directly benefit
from crew factors research.
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Obviously, the current analysis was highly constrained by the fact that the experiment was
not designed to explore non-verbal communication. One clear drawback was the location of
the Manual and Auto groups' checklist interface, at the bottom half of the touch-sensitive
CRT, underneath the system-control interface that was used by all three groups. Although
the Paper crews held the checklist in their hand, and had no electronic interface with the
checklist itself, their interaction with the top part of the display was reflected in the non-
verbal activity data. Any experiment that sets out to focus on the different impact of paper
and electronic interfaces should be designed to minimize confounding the two, by making
those aspects of the task that are being compared spatially unambiguous; the checklist
interface should have been presented on a dedicated, exdusive, touch-sensitive display.
Such design of mutually exclusive interfaces would also afford precise design of
measurement procedures, in particular, optimal camera location and precise operational
definition of different control actions.
The method of measurement of non-verbal activity and its potential contributions to crew
communication proved to be complex. Placement of the video cameras behind the pilots in
the aircraft's centerline - which provided observers with an over-the-pilots'-shoulders
perspective - provided reasonable resolution regarding reaching and touching the checklist
display. Other activities, however, such as manipulations of switches located on the
pedestal or off to the side, were either occluded by the pilots or simply outside the cameras'
field of view. It seems that two additional wide-field-of-view cameras mounted above each
pilot's head may provide better coverage of the cockpit, and a perspective that is closer to
that which the pilots themselves occupy. Further, the behind-the-back perspective did not
provide accurate information regarding the pilots' focus of visual attention; while the coding
scheme captured those times when pilots clearly turned their heads to look across the
cockpit, it can be assumed that quick glances that were performed without head movement
had gone undetected by the coders. To truly capture this aspect of the pilots' in-crew
monitoring activity, eye-trackers would have provided invaluable data, which, combined
with manual system-control activity in the same time-line, could serve to accurately
discriminate the informativeness of specific actions and particular locations of activity.
The coding of non-verbal activity from the video recordings proved equally challenging.
Ideally, one would want the coding to be done by observers who are as familiar with the
task domain as the pilots themselves. In this respect, one would want to allocate research
funds to obtain pilots not only as subjects, but also for assistance with all subsequent coding
and analysis tasks. The procedure of "coding by consensus," though time consuming, seems
to provide data that are more consistent and reliable than independent coding. These two
requirements emphasize the logistic difficulty of obtaining a large number of highly skilled
individuals for the purpose of data interpretation and coding. The key issue remains the
operational definition of particular actions. It may be useful to obtain subjective reports
from the pilots themselves regarding the visibility and informativeness of different cockpit
activities. Hopefully, the inclusions of eye-trackers in the measurement process will further
clarify those specific actions and locations that draw the pilots' attention, thus providing
further validity to the coding scheme.
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While certain implications of particular designs were discussed above, the findings failed to
provide the necessary connection between design and performance, thus precluding specific
conclusions regarding specific design recommendations. Since the performance ratings
given by the in-flight observer conflict with the analysis of performance suggested by
Mosier (1992), it is hard to assign concrete values to any one of the three different checklist
interfaces. Further, since a clear performance advantage could not be identified, it is
impossible to provide specific design guidelines which relate to checklist design. It is
interesting that the literature (e.g., Wiener, 1991) describes numerous similar cases, in which
the comparison of manual and automated systems failed to yield significant differences in
performance ratings. The repeated failure of applied research to reveal significant effects
highlights the fundamental difficulty associated with this type of work, namely, the
difficulty of assembling a sample that is large enough to provide sufficient statistical power.
As one gets closer to "real world" settings, the procedures of recruiting highly proficient
subjects become extremely complex - and, more importantly (and unfortunately), extremely
expensive. While these complications do not diminish the importance of applied research,
they should encourage researchers to be creative in the use of basic research settings as
springboards for applied work.
Nevertheless, discussion of the data presented in the TESS does suggest that in the context
of this experiment, the Manual condition seemed to be the poorest design, since it
significantly increased cockpit activity without offering any benefit associated with
automation. If the Auto design were to reduce workload below Paper, one could argue
against it on the basis that it may cause the crews to remain "out of the loop." This,
however, was not the case: overall, crews in the Auto condition were busier than the Paper
crews. In this respect, changes in interface design alone, such as the change from a hand-
held, paper checklist to an electronic-manual interface, do not seem justify the cost in
materials and training which are usually associated with such upgrades. Further, the lack of
difference in activity level between the Auto and Manual groups suggests that automation
at the content level alone - i.e., automation that performs only the items on a particular
checklist, while leaving the task of choosing the checklist to the pilots - does not necessarily
alleviate workload. While the Auto checklist may have provided added redundancy, for
automation to truly impact workload, all levels of the task - in this case, the checklist task -
should be automated, including such things as mode selection and identification of
appropriate page/procedure. The argument can be made that an upgrade of the
functionality of the system, such as provided by automation, is a necessary element in any
interface modernization program.
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6. Summary.
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No one has a more sweeping influence on task performance - and crew-machine interaction
- than the designer (Senge 1990). This statement presents the applied objective which this
research proposal wished to address. Specifically, the proposed research hoped to identify
some of the unique qualities of crew-machine interaction, i.e., how multiple operators interact
in the context of performing a control task. Using video data recorded in a high-fidelity
simulator, the research program provided a methodology for coding and analyzing the
complex relationship between pilots involved in the task of controlling an aircraft and
managing its systems under high-workload conditions. The primary goal of the research
was to identify connection between control activity and crew coordination; this was done by
including non-verbal communication as an integral part of information exchanged in the
cockpit. Based on the analysis of video and audio recordings, the results identified several
consistent differences between crews flying aircraft with different checklist interface
designs. The research program aimed to unite - in both theory and application - two
streams of human factors research. In this respect, the results provided the connection
between studies of group dynamics and the design of human-machine interface. It is hoped
that the results encourage further investigations that look at the non-verbal aspect of
communication, and that they may serve to define specific guidelines for the design of
future cockpits and similar multi-operator control stations.
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